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I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory vaccination laws require children to be vaccinated
against certain communicable diseases to attend school. These laws
also provide exemptions to school vaccination requirements.1 All
states exempt children from vaccination requirements for medical rea-
sons, and most states also provide an exemption for religious and/or
other personal reasons.2 Seven states include an educational compo-
nent in their religious or philosophical exemption process, requiring
that parents receive information regarding the benefits of vaccination
and the risks of not being vaccinated.3 Of these seven states, five re-
1. See State School Immunization Requirements and Vaccine Exemption Laws,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 2 (Feb. 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/
phlp/docs/school-vaccinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JRQ-MEA2].
2. See Erik Skinner, Vaccination Policies: Requirements and Exemptions for En-
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quire that information regarding the social benefits of vaccination will
be provided to parents.4
This type of legislation is part of an overall trend to tighten the vac-
cine exemption process, which is reflected in the vaccination laws of
an increasing number of states.5 Tightening the vaccine exemption
process through the addition of administrative requirements has been
proven to decrease exemption rates.6 But this is not the focus of this
Article. Instead, the Article focuses on one aspect of the educational
component of the legislation—educating parents regarding the social
benefits of vaccines. The Article explores the nature of the obligation
to be educated regarding the social benefits of vaccines and the poten-
tial influence of this legislation on parents’ vaccination decision
making.
I claim that this legislation should be conceptualized and under-
stood through the concept of solidarity. Following this conclusion, I
will explore the potential effects of solidarity legislation on parents’
vaccination behavior. For this purpose, two aspects of the legislation
will be addressed. First, I will discuss the language included in these
laws, which explicitly declare that vaccines have social benefits. I will
explore the expressive functions of this language and their potential
influence on parental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. I will continue
by addressing the educational process that this legislation requires.
Addressing this aspect of the legislation, I will examine whether pro-
viding parents information regarding the social benefits of vaccines
through educational encounters is expected to increase their motiva-
tion to vaccinate their child.
The Article comprises four parts. Section II discusses the term “soli-
darity” in general and in the special context of healthcare and vaccina-
tion. Solidarity, I conclude, is of special importance in the context of
vaccination. Section III describes the legal rules that obligate parents
to be educated regarding the social benefits of vaccines. This section
presents the transformation of solidarity from an ethical value to a
legal component, thus creating legislation, which I will name “solidar-
ity legislation.” Section IV presents the expressive approach to the law
and applies it to solidarity legislation. The Article presents and applies
4. See infra text accompanying notes 60–84.
5. James Lobo, Vindicating the Vaccine: Injecting Strength into Mandatory School
Vaccination Requirements to Safeguard the Public Health, 57 B.C. L. REV. 261,
285–286 (2016); Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemp-
tions to State Immunization Laws, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645, 647 (2001). For exam-
ple, personal and religious belief exemptions are not allowed in some states. See, e.g.,
Act of June 30, 2015, ch. 35, 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1440 (West); Act of May 28, 2015,
ch.37, § 4, 2015 Vt. Acts & Resolves 341, 345–46. Legal initiatives to eliminate relig-
ious and/or philosophical belief exemptions to vaccination were also undertaken in
other states. See, e.g., H.B. 1043, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); H.F. 261,
87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017).
6. See Saad B. Omer et al., Vaccination Policies and Rates of Exemption From
Immunization, 2005–2011, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170, 1171 (2012).
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three expressive theories of the law: “the attitudinal theory,” “the in-
formational theory,” and “theories of coordination.” The discussion in
this section suggests that although solidarity legislation has an expres-
sive potential and is thus expected to have an influence on parents’
vaccination behavior, there are reasons to believe that its influence on
parents’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors will be limited. Section V fo-
cuses on the educational process that is expected to occur following
the legislation and its potential effects on parents’ vaccination deci-
sions. It concludes that the causal connection between providing par-
ents information regarding vaccines’ prosocial benefits and
vaccination decisions is not straightforward. Based on the previous
sections of the Article, Section VI suggests that the expressive and
direct influence of solidarity legislation may be improved, for exam-
ple, by framing the information provided to parents or providing them
with certain types of information. Section VII concludes the Article
and provides suggestions for reform.
II. SOLIDARITY, PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS AND VACCINATION
Although it is commonly accepted that solidarity is a prosocial con-
cept,7 scholars’ understandings of the term are diverse, changing over
time and across contexts.8 Accordingly, solidarity has many different
meanings and definitions9 and has often been described as vague,
7. See, e.g., Ulrich Steinvorth, The Concept and Possibilities of Solidarity, in PHIL-
OSOPHICAL STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE: SOLIDARITY 29, 29 (Kurt Bayertz
ed., 1999); Shawn H. E. Harmon, Solidarity: A (New) Ethic for Global Health Policy
14 Health Care Analysis 215, 216 (2006); Jelena Vasiljeviæ, The Possibilities and Con-
strains of Engaging Solidarity in Citizenship, 27 FILOZOFIJA I DRUSTVO 373, 381
(2016).
8. For an extensive discussion of the historical and political legacy of the term
solidarity, see Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerg-
ing Concept in Bioethics, NUFFIELD COUNS. ON BIOETHICS 6–10 (Nov. 2011), http://
nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Solidarity_report_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7T2F-H2NE] [hereinafter Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity]; Alek-
sander Glos, Solidarity in the Legal Frames, 44 DIAMETROS 204, 205 (2015); Michel
Hoelzl, Recognizing the Sacrificial Victim: The problem of solidarity for Critical Social
Theory, 6 J. FOR CULTURAL & RELIGIOUS THEORY 45, 50–53 (2004). See generally
Karl H. Metz, Solidarity and History: Institutions and Social Concepts of Solidarity in
19th Century Western Europe, in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CUL-
TURE: SOLIDARITY 191, 191–207 (Kurt Bayertz ed., 1999).
9. For a review of the different meanings of solidarity, see, e.g., Barbara Prain-
sack & Alena Buyx, Thinking Ethical and Regulatory Frameworks in Medicine From
the Perspective of Solidarity on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 37 THEORETICAL MED.
BIOETHICS 489, 490 (2016) [hereinafter Prainsack & Buyx, Thinking Ethical]; Prain-
sack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at 20–22, 36; Harmon, supra note 7, at 217;
Ruud Ter Meulen, Solidarity and Justice in Health Care: A Critical Analysis of Their
Relationship, 43 DIAMETROS 1, 9–10, 14–16 (2015); Emmanuel Melissaris, On Solidar-
ity (LSE L., Soc’y & Econ. Working Paper, No. 10/2017); AVERY KOLERS, A MORAL
THEORY OF SOLIDARITY 4 (2016); Darryl Gunson, Solidarity and the Universal Decla-
ration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 34 J. MED. & PHILOSOPHY 241, 244–45 (2009).
This observation also applies to the context of health care. See Richard B. Saltman,
Health Sector Solidarity: A Core European Value but with Broadly Varying Content, 4
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controversial, and complex.10
Against this background, Prainsack and Buyx’s current and exten-
sive work, which includes a systematic analysis of the term “solidar-
ity,” is of substantial importance.11 Seeking to set out the basic
elements of the term “solidarity,”12 Prainsack and Buyx define soli-
darity in its most elementary form as an act of commitment to carry
the “costs” (financial, social, emotional, and other contributions) of
assisting others with whom the individual finds similarity in a relevant
respect.13
They further claim that solidarity, as they understand it, has several
characteristics. First and foremost, it is a practice. Something that is
enacted, not merely a feeling, a thought, or an abstract concept. Thus,
it requires actions. Motivations or feelings, such as empathy, are not
sufficient.14 Second, while focusing on costs, their definition of solidar-
ity does not exclude scenarios in which groups and individuals also
benefit from assisting others. According to this view, a collateral self-
interested motivation for an act or even the expectation of a personal
benefit does not prevent a practice from being solidaristic. It is only
when self-interest is the main motivation that the resulting practice
should not be considered solidaristic.15 Third, while solidaristic prac-
ISR. J. HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1, 1–2 (2015); Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8,
at 20, 22.
10. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at 36; Glos, supra note 8, at
204; Hoelzl, supra note 8, at 45; Kurt Bayertz, Four Uses of “Solidarity”, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE: SOLIDARITY 3, 4 (Kurt Bayertz ed.,
1999); Saltman, supra note 9, at 1.
11. I chose to focus on Prainsack and Buyx’s work for three reasons: first, their
work provides one of the most extensive reviews of the term “solidarity.” Second, it is
a project accomplished in recent years. Thus, it provides an up-to-date review of the
term. Third, while reflecting on the nature of the term “solidarity” in general and
based on different perspectives, Prainsack and Buyx present a working definition of
the term that cuts across political, philosophical, and social dimensions. Thus, their
working definition is applicable to various bioethics discussions.
12. See Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics—
Towards a New Approach, 26 BIOETHICS 343, 346 (2012) [hereinafter Prainsack &
Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics].
13. See Prainsack & Buyx, Thinking Ethical, supra note 9, at 493; Prainsack &
Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at 46. Prainsack and Buyx claim that solidarity is an act
of commitment to carry costs, which was criticized by Dawson and Jennings. Dawson
and Jennings claimed that costs are not a necessary requirement for solidarity. Angus
Dawson & Bruce Jennings, The Place of Solidarity in Public Health Ethics, 34 PUB.
HEALTH REV. 65, 74 (2012). Considering that Prainsack and Buyx included “other
contributions” in the term “costs,” it is questionable whether this theoretical dispute
is of practical meaning. Moreover, there can be no dispute that in the context of the
paper, the vaccinated child and the parents incur costs.
14. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra note 12, at
346; Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at 49. This characteristic was also
noted by other scholars as a necessary requirement of solidarity. See, e.g., Gunson,
supra note 9, at 246.
15. See Prainsack & Buyx, Thinking Ethical, supra note 9, at 494. For the claim
that solidarity is characterized through motivation that reaches beyond self-interest
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-FEB-19 10:19
2019] ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF SOLIDARITY 349
tice regularly occurs in a context of stark differences among individu-
als, it requires the recognition of relevant similarity among
individuals.16 According to their understanding of the term, individu-
als practice solidarity with other individuals with whom they recognize
subjective similarity in a relevant respect.17 This requirement is met if
an individual considers himself or herself to have something in com-
mon with the other individuals who matter in a specific situation.18
The recognition of similarity may take many forms: It entails the
awareness of being associated by choice, fate, or other circumstances
with other individuals. Alternatively, it is an instance of seeing one’s
own potential or actual fate, or that of loved ones, in the fate of
another.19
Prainsack and Buyx further identify three tiers by which individuals
come to engage in practicing solidarity.20 The first tier applies to the
interpersonal level. At this level, solidarity comprises manifestations
of the willingness to carry costs to assist other individuals with whom a
person recognizes sameness or similarity in at least one relevant re-
spect.21 Solidarity in the second tier is comprised of manifestations of
a collective commitment to carry costs to assist other individuals who
and, as such, may be described as non-instrumental cooperation, see Glos, supra note
8, at 207–08; Dawson & Jennings, supra note 13, at 74.
16. In the words of Gunson: “Although it may be natural to think of solidarity as
being between members of the same group, it need not be. All that seems to be re-
quired is that people—groups or individuals—are connected by their adherence to or
support for a common goal.” Gunson, supra note 9, at 246–47. See also Glos, supra
note 8, at 206 (for the same approach).
17. Prainsack & Buyx, Thinking Ethical, supra note 9, at 494.
18. See id.; Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra note
12, at 346–47.
19. Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra note 12, at 346.
Other scholars have described similarity as sharing the same ends, which may take the
form of sharing values, ideals, aspirations or goals, such as equality and justice. See
Adam Steven Cureton, On the Nature, Grounds and Limits of Social Moral Rules 64
(2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill),
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:607865cf-e155-4d0f-8844-45fa9275c331
[https://perma.cc/9JT3-YZKB]; Vasiljeviæ, supra note 7, at 381; Harmon, supra note 7,
at 218.
20. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra note 12, at
346–48. This distinction was criticized by Dawson and Jennings. Dawson and Jennings
claimed that level 2 is the real heart of solidarity. Dawson & Jennings, supra note 13,
at 73. Moreover, level 1 should not be considered as solidarity at all because it misses
the dimension of a group in which individuals share common commitments towards
other individuals in the group. See id. Considering that childhood vaccination ad-
dresses commitments towards other individuals in a given community, there is no
need to resolve this dispute for the purpose of this Article. The claim that childhood
vaccination addresses commitments towards other individuals in a given community
will subsequently be explored. See supra Part II.
21. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra note 12, at
346. Like Prainsack and Buyx, other scholars claim that solidarity may exist at the
individual level. See, e.g., Gunson, supra note 9, at 248 (claiming that solidarity has no
obvious limits, and thus, it may exist in the context of individuals, groups, communi-
ties, and the global society).
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are all linked by means of a shared situation or cause.22 Tier-three
solidarity is created when values or principles of solidarity manifest
themselves in contractual or other legal norms. These contractual or
legal arrangements are highly institutionalized enactments of carrying
costs to assist other individuals recognized as having sameness.23
This Article is also inspired by Bierhoff and Kupper’s distinction
between two forms of solidarity: (1) solidarity formed based on com-
mon interest; and (2) solidarity with the interests of other individu-
als.24 The first form of solidarity refers to the cooperation of
concerned individuals with the goal of improvement of their own fate.
The basic idea of this form of solidarity is that certain groups of indi-
viduals who have a group interest in common recognize that they pre-
sumably are not able to reach the goal by individual efforts; however,
it is possible to be successful as a group of individuals who experience
a community of interests.25 The second form of solidarity is not di-
rectly linked to one’s interests. Solidarity of this type is elicited by
treating problems of needy individuals all over the world. In this case,
solidarity does not serve one’s interests.26 Jorgen Husted, who made a
similar distinction, referred to these two forms of solidarity as group
solidarity and moral solidarity.27 Within group solidarity, the common
interest is the cement or organizing principle of the group. The mem-
bers have a common interest in the sense that what is good or harmful
to this interest is (or, at least, is perceived to be) good or harmful to
the individual. In situations in which solidarity is not practiced for the
common interest of an identifiable group or is only practiced to a lim-
ited extent, Husted suggests that individuals may demonstrate solidar-
ity for the sake of the needy benefiting from it. In these circumstances,
the act is based on individual moral responsibility rather than collec-
tive responsibility to a group. Instead of a defined group with shared
aims and objectives, there is a more general bond between individuals,
a sense of sharing a common lot and recognizing oneself in the other
individuals. Husted suggests “that the basic principle underpinning
22. As Prainsack and Buyx explained, this is the case, for example, with respect to
self-help groups. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics, supra
note 12, at 347.
23. Examples of this solidarity include welfare states and welfare society arrange-
ments. See id.
24. Hans W. Bierhoff & Beate Kupper, Social Psychology of Solidarity, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE: SOLIDARITY 133, 133 (Kurt Bayertz
ed., 1999).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 134.
27. Darren Shickle et al., Public Policies, Law and Bioethics: A Framework for
Producing Public Health Policy Across the European Union, EUR. PUB. HEALTH ETH-
ICS NETWORK 85 (Mar. 1, 2003–Aug. 31, 2006), http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/100247/
1/EuroPHENfullreport_libre.pdf [https://perma.cc/V84H-VKWZ].
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this form of solidarity is making the other person’s causes one’s own
out of a sense of duty.”28
In the recent years, the concept of solidarity has been increasingly
addressed in bioethical discourse.29 Overall, this discourse is in its be-
ginning; however, the notion of solidarity has been invoked more ex-
plicitly and substantially more frequently in the field of public health
than in other areas of bioethics.30
This is not surprising. Solidarity is highly relevant to the context of
public health.31 As Verweij and Dawson indicated, “public health . . .
consists of collective interventions that aim to promote and protect
the health of the public.”32 Public health addresses the issue of what
“we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which peo-
ple can be healthy.”33 In contrast to personal healthcare, which has
the individual patient as its primary focus, public health strives to im-
28. Id.
29. Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Solidarity for Global Health, 26
BIOETHICS ii, ii (2012). For an overview of this literature see Prainsack & Buyx, Soli-
darity, supra note 8, at 20–22; Dawson & Jennings, supra note 13, at 72; Gunson, supra
note 9, at 243. Prainsack and Buyx reported that although explicit references to soli-
darity in bioethics are relatively scare, solidarity is substantially more prominent in
bioethics writing than its explicit use. Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at
36.
30. See Prainsack & Buyx, Solidarity, supra note 8, at 23; Solidarity in Public
Health Ethics and Practice: Its Conceptions, Uses and Implications, QUE. NAT’L COL-
LABORATING CTR. FOR HEALTHY PUB. POL’Y 3–5 (July 2015), http://www.ncchpp.ca/
docs/2015_Ethics_Solidarity_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/75HJ-YNUS]. The idea that sol-
idarity is a relevant value to public health discourse was expressed in several ethical
documents. See, e.g., Principles of the Ethical Practice of Public Health, PUB. HEALTH
LEADERSHIP SOC’Y 2 (2002), https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/membergroups/
ethics/ethics_brochure.ashx [https://perma.cc/T3S7-VBUV]; UNESCO Res. 24, U.N.
DOC. 33 C/22, § 13 (Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights) (Oct. 19,
2005); A Framework for the Ethical Conduct of Public Health Initiatives, PUB.
HEALTH ONT. 10 (Apr. 2012), https://www.publichealthontario.ca/en/eRepository/
PHO%20%20Framework%20for%20Ethical%20Conduct%20of%20Public%20
Health%20Initiatives%20April%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RFQ-WXXM]; NUF-
FIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PUBLIC HEALTH: ETHICAL ISSUES 23 (2007), http://nuf
fieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Public-health-ethical-issues.pdf. [https:/
/perma.cc/4BLW-AHTB]. A different understanding of current public health dis-
course was presented by Dawson and Jennings. Dawson and Jennings claimed that
solidarity is largely a term missing from the discussion of public health ethics. See
Dawson & Jennings, supra note 13, at 71. I believe that it is impossible to ignore the
increasing attention that the term “solidarity” has received in the context of bioethics
and health since Prainsack and Buyx published their work.
31. Some scholars, for example, Dawson and Jennings, claim that solidarity is and
ought to be at the heart of ethical thinking about public health. See Dawson & Jen-
nings, supra note 13, at 76.
32. MARCEL VERWEIJ & ANGUS DAWSON, The Meaning of ‘Public’ in ‘Public
Health’, in ETHICS, PREVENTION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 13, 21 (Angus Dawson &
Marcel Verweij eds., 2007).
33. Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics Theory: Review and Path to Convergence, 40
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 86 (2012). See also Lawrence Gostin, Legal Foundations of
Public Health Law and its Role in Meeting Future Challenges, 120 PUB. HEALTH 8, 8
(2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 8 15-FEB-19 10:19
352 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
prove, through collective actions, the functioning and longevity of
populations.34 As the previous discussion indicates, solidarity is a con-
cept that concerns groups or communities and involves prosocial be-
havior. It follows that, by its very nature, solidarity is a relevant value
to public health ethics. Moreover, the practical success of public
health policies and programs, as well as their capacity to gain norma-
tive legitimacy, often relies on the presence of a cultural sense of soli-
darity, mutual aid, and cooperation.35 As the Bellagio statement of
principles maintained, “public health efforts are more likely to suc-
ceed in an atmosphere of social solidarity and trust.”36
The connection between solidarity and public health stands out in
the case of vaccination. For individuals who can be vaccinated, vacci-
nation is not only an act of personal benefits, but it is also an act of
solidarity, which involves social benefits.37
First, when sufficient numbers of individuals in a specified group
have been vaccinated, “herd immunity” (which is also termed “popu-
lation immunity” or “community immunity”) occurs. Once created,
herd immunity provides protection to members of the community who
do not have the required immunity.38 There may be various reasons
why some children have not been or cannot be vaccinated. Some chil-
dren cannot receive the vaccine for medical reasons. Other children
have not reached the age at which vaccination is recommended. There
are children who were not vaccinated because they lack access to
health services or their parents have refused the vaccine. Other chil-
dren may not have the required immunity although vaccinated. For
example, some children did not complete the recommended childhood
immunization schedule, and some individuals did not develop protec-
tive responses to vaccines (vaccine failure). These individuals depend
on herd immunity for protection from the disease.39 The social nature
of vaccination is also reflected in cases in which the infectious disease
causes serious harm to specific sectors of the population but not to
34. Gostin, supra note 33, at 10; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 30,
at 5–6.
35. Bruce Jennings, Relational Liberty Revisited: Membership, Solidarity and a
Public Health Ethics of Place, 8 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 7, 7 (2015); see Gostin, supra,
note 33, at 9.
36. Bellagio Statement of Principles, BELLAGIO MEETING ON SCO. JUST. & INFLU-
ENZA (July 2006), https://www.unicef.org/avianflu/files/Bellagio_Statement.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/TY2Y-W2KV].
37. See Mabel Berezin & Alicia Eads, Risk is for the Rich?: Childhood Vaccination
Resistance and a Culture of Health, 165 SOC. SCI. & MED. 233, 234 (2016).
38. See A Framework for the Ethical Conduct of Public Health Initiatives, supra
note 30, at 7; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 54. When herd
immunity occurs, the additional benefit to the individual from being vaccinated is very
small because, even if not vaccinated, he would likely be protected from the disease
through herd immunity. Id. at 56. In these cases, the main benefit of vaccination oc-
curs at the community level through the maintenance of herd immunity, which pro-
tects individuals who, for distinct reasons, do not have the required immunity. Id.
39. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 54.
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other sectors. For example, some diseases seriously affect females
rather than males or vice versa. In these scenarios, individuals are re-
quired to receive a vaccine to protect against a disease that would not
seriously harm them in order to achieve population immunity and
protect other individuals who it could seriously harm. One example is
the mumps, measles, and rubella vaccine (“MMR”). MMR is adminis-
tered to both boys and girls, even though mumps is generally most
serious for males, and rubella is serious only for pregnant women.40
At a more communal level, vaccination saves healthcare and other
societal costs.41 It prevents outbreaks of infectious diseases and, as a
result, reduces the rates of morbidity and mortality. Thus, the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) estimates that immunization currently
averts an estimated 2 to 3 million deaths every year worldwide.42 In
addition, in cases in which a disease can be eradicated, successful vac-
cination programs are expected to save future vaccination costs, as
occurred with smallpox.43 Findings reported by the Center for Disease
Control (“CDC”) in 2011 support these claims. According to these
findings, adherence to the childhood immunization schedule of each
U.S.-born cohort not only prevented approximately 42,000 deaths and
20 million cases of disease but also led to a “net savings of nearly $14
billion in direct costs and $69 billion in total societal costs.”44 In the
United Kingdom, infectious diseases continue to account for more
than 10% of deaths and approximately one in three consultations in
primary care.45
Finally, health is an important form of human capital. An increasing
amount of research focuses on the relationship between health out-
comes and economic growth. This literature expresses a growing con-
sensus that improving health has a positive effect on national
economic growth.46 For example, health enhances the productivity of
40. Id. at 56–57.
41. See Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001–2010, 306 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 36, 36 (2011); NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at
54; Angus Dawson, The Moral Case for the Routine Vaccination of Children in Devel-
oped and Developing Countries, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1029, 1031–32 (2011).
42. 10 Facts on Immunization, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/fea
tures/factfiles/immunization/en/ (last updated Mar. 2018) [https://perma.cc/PGS2-6G
D5].
43. Dawson, supra note 41, at 1032.
44. Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001–2010, supra note
41, at 36.
45. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 51–52.
46. See, e.g., Peter Lorentzen et al., Death and Development 13 J. ECON. GROWTH
81, 83 (2008); Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Disease and Development: The
Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth, 115 J. POL. ECON. 925, 925 (2007);
Daron Acemoglu et al., Disease and Development in Historical Perspective, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 397, 398 (2003); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND
HEALTH MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH 21–22
(Sept. 2005), http://www.who.int/macrohealth/action/Report%20of%20the%20Nation
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workers by increasing their physical and mental capacities.47 From this
perspective, encouraging individuals to adopt behaviors that will im-
prove their health as well as the health of others is an important con-
dition to the economic development of societies. This is particularly
true regarding vaccination, which may lead to substantial improve-
ments in health outcomes at relatively low costs.48
The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that although vacci-
nating a child is first and foremost an act that aims to protect the vac-
cinated child, it also serves as a means to protect the health of others
and promote the collective good. At the same time, vaccinating a child
is an act that involves costs for both the child and his or her parent, for
example, time, pain, physical inconvenience, emotional distress, mild
side effects, and, in rare cases, serious illness, which may result in disa-
bility or death. It follows that vaccinating a child is an act that shares
two characteristics with solidarity: carrying costs and assisting other
individuals. The third characteristic of solidarity, similarity, is also pre-
sent in childhood vaccination. Vaccinating a child is often perceived
and presented as an act promoted by common interests and the recog-
nition of similarity between children that can be vaccinated (and their
parents) and other individuals. For example, the CDC website states:
“Immunizing individual children also helps to protect the health of
our community . . . Vaccine-preventable diseases have a costly impact,
resulting in doctor’s visits, hospitalizations, and premature deaths.
Sick children can also cause parents to lose time from work.”49 The
idea that vaccination is an act based, in part, on the existence of mu-
tual interest is also expressed by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. Its website states: “To help keep them safe, it is im-
portant that you and your children who are able to get vaccinated are
fully immunized. This not only protects your family but also helps pre-
vent the spread of these diseases to your friends and loved ones.”50
It follows that in the context of public health, vaccinating a child is
also an act of solidarity. In the next Section, I describe how solidarity
al%20Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/X95K-WMM2]; Julio Frenk, Health and the
Economy: A Vital Relationship, OECD OBSERVER (May 2004), http://oecdobserver
.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1241/Health_and_the_economy:_A_vital_relationship
_.html. [https://perma.cc/P22B-MEG3].
47. David E. Bloom & David Canning, Health and Economic Growth: Reconciling
the Micro and Macro Evidence 2 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., and the Rule of Law,
Working Paper No. 42, 2005), https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
BloomCanning_42.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KU7-CKVZ].
48. Id. at 4.
49. Why Are Childhood Vaccines So Important?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/howvpd.htm#why (last updated
Aug. 18, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WC3X-L9BJ].
50. Five Important Reasons to Vaccinate Your Child, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, https://www.vaccines.gov/more_info/features/five-important-reasons-to-vac
cinate-your-child.html (last updated Jan. 2018) [https://perma.cc/3LCG-EU54].
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extended its ethical boundaries and became part of vaccination
legislation.
III. TRANSFORMING SOLIDARITY FROM AN ETHICAL VALUE TO A
COMPONENT OF VACCINATION LEGISLATION
In 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the states’ power and
authority to pass compulsory vaccination laws to protect public
health.51 To date, all fifty states require children to be vaccinated
against certain communicable diseases to attend school.52 State laws
also provide exemptions to school vaccination requirements.53 All
states exempt children from vaccination requirements for medical rea-
sons, and most states also provide an exemption for religious and/or
other personal reasons.54
State laws also establish the requirements regarding the exemption
application process.55 The methods for obtaining exemptions vary
from state to state with respect to administrative issues, authority to
approve exemption, and filling requirements.56 For example, the most
lenient states only require that parents sign a statement indicating
their religious or personal opposition to vaccination.57 Stricter states
require parents to present parental notarization or an affidavit with
their exemption applications.58
Several state laws included in their religious or philosophical ex-
emption process an educational component, according to which par-
ents are obligated to receive information regarding the benefits of
vaccination and the risks of not being vaccinated.59 While generally
51. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
52. State School Immunization Requirements and Vaccine Exemption Laws, supra
note 1, at 1. Vaccination laws often apply to public schools and private schools. Id.
Most school entry laws focus on children entering kindergarten. However, in many
states, school entry requirements also apply to daycare programs, middle schools, col-
leges, and universities. See id. at 1–2.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Skinner, supra note 2.
55. State School Immunization Requirements and Vaccine Exemption Laws, supra
note 1, at 2. For example, some states require that a parental notarization or affidavit
is attached to the exemption application. See infra text accompanying note 61–84.
56. Rota et al., supra note 5, at 646–48.
57. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4802(2) (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-
903(2)(b) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.671(B)(4) (LexisNexis 2018).
58. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.4, § 06.055(b)(3) (2018); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 121A.15(3)(d) (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-271.2(C) (2016); Kevin Hooker,
Note, Exemptions to Vaccine Mandates: The Problem and Possible Remedies, 14
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 263, 266 (2014).
59. The obligation to be educated regarding the risks and benefits of vaccines as a
precondition to an exemption from vaccination should be distinguished from the in-
formation provided to parents through the Vaccine Information Statements (“VIS”).
All vaccine providers, public or private, are required by the National Vaccine Child-
hood Injury Act of 1986 § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26 (2012) to provide the appropriate
VIS to the patient (or parent or legal representative) prior to every dose of specific
vaccines. It follows that although information should be provided to parents accord-
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applying to parents the same statutory duty to be educated, these laws
apply different rules with respect to several issues: the entity responsi-
ble for education; the information that should be provided to parents;
the methods for providing the information; and the type of exemp-
tion— religious and/or personal—to which the education component
applies. Among these issues, the most relevant to this Article is the
type of information that should be provided to parents. However, for
completeness of the picture, I will shortly present each law in its
entirety.
Overall, seven state laws included an educational component in
their exemption process; these states include Michigan, Vermont, Ore-
gon, Illinois, Washington, Arizona, and Utah.60 As of December 21,
2014, Michigan law requires with respect to nonmedical exemptions,
the local health department certify that the individual received educa-
tion on the risks of not receiving the vaccines being waived and the
benefits of vaccination to the individual and the community.61
A similar rule applies in Vermont. As of July 1, 2012, Vermont law
requires that a child’s parent or guardian sign a form created by the
state’s Health Department and annually submit it to the school or
child-care facility. The signed document should certify that that the
person, parent, or guardian “holds religious beliefs opposed to immu-
nization” and “has reviewed evidence-based educational material
[provided by the Health Department] regarding immunizations.” The
educational material shall include information regarding the follow-
ing: the risks of adverse reactions to immunization; risks of con-
tracting or carrying a vaccine-preventable infectious disease due to the
failure to complete the required vaccination schedule; and the risks to
persons with special health needs attending schools and child care fa-
cilities who are unable to be vaccinated or who are more likely to
contract a vaccine-preventable communicable disease and for whom
this disease could be life-threatening.62
ing to both types of legislation, the VIS forms are provided to parents who chose to
vaccinate their child, whereas the educational obligation of states applies to parents
who request an exemption. For the purpose of this Article, it should also be noted
that the VIS forms focus on the benefits and risks of the vaccine to the vaccinated
child and do not mention the social benefits of vaccination.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61–84. At least three other states, including
Connecticut, Minnesota, and Texas, undertook legislative initiatives to include an ed-
ucational component in the exemption process, but they have not succeeded. See H.B.
7059, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017). S.F. 143, 90th Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 2017); H.B. 241, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
61. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 325.176 (2018). Accordingly, parents who request an
exemption must declare that they have participated in a waiver session. 2018 Immuni-
zation Waiver Form, ST. MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.michigan
.gov/documents/mdch/Sample_Waiver_485823_7.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/J8FZ-TZ4G].
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 1122(a)(3) (2017). The exemption form uses the same
wording as the law. See School Year 2018–19 Religious Immunization Exemption:
Child Care and Schools, VT. DEP’T HEALTH, http://orangesouthwest.org/uploads/
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According to the law in Oregon, a child is exempted from immuni-
zation if the child presents a form signed by the parent of the child,
stating that the parent is declining one or more immunizations on be-
half of the child.63 The law further states that the document must in-
clude one of the following: (1) a signed verification from a healthcare
practitioner that he or she has reviewed information regarding the
risks and benefits of immunization with the parent that is consistent
with information published by the CDC and the contents of the vac-
cine-educational module;64 or (2) a certificate verifying that the parent
has completed a vaccine educational module.65 The Oregon vaccine-
educational module provides parents diverse information regarding
vaccination, including a description of the benefits of vaccines. The
module describes not only the benefits of vaccines to the vaccinated
child but also its importance in protecting the health of others.66
An educational component was also added to the vaccination ex-
emption process by the Illinois legislature on August 3, 2015.67 Ac-
cording to the law in Illinois, a child is exempt from immunization if
1528296877.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/48M5-ZVJU]. More de-
tailed information is included in an information sheet articulated by the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia Vaccine Education Center. See Vaccinated or Unvaccinated:
What You Should Know?, CHILDREN’S HOSP. PHILA. (2017), https://media.chop.edu/
data/files/pdfs/vaccine-education-center-vaccinated-unvaccinated.pdf [https://perma
.cc/V24Y-22RB] [hereinafter Information Sheet]. Parents are invited to review the
information sheet to learn more about collective immunity. See Parent Education Re-
quired for Completion of Vermont’s Religious Exemption Form, VT. DEP’T HEALTH 1
(Jan. 1, 2018), http://www.healthvermont.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/ID_IZ_
CCP_Parent_Education_for_Religious_Exemption.pdf [https://perma.cc/H75A-
LZA4]. The information sheet includes the following explanation: “Just as every fam-
ily relies on their community for protection of their loved ones, so too does every
family contribute to the relative strength of their community’s ability to stave off the
spread of infection. So how does this work? . . . On the other hand, as the unvac-
cinated population increases, so does the opportunity for a pathogen to spread
through the community. This shared environment is important to all families because
studies have shown that vaccinated people in a relatively unvaccinated community are
at greater risk than unvaccinated people in a highly vaccinated community. In the first
case, the roof is too leaky; in the second case, it’s not. Therefore, collectively, the
community plays an important role in individual protection, particularly for those
who are most susceptible.
63. OR. REV. STAT. § 433.267(1)(c) (2017).
64. Id. § 433.267(1)(c)(B)(i).
65. Id. § 433.267(1)(c)(B)(ii). The educational component went into effect on
March 1, 2014. See Act of June 26, 2013, ch. 515, §§ 1, 5, 2013 Or. Laws 1356, 1356–57.
66. See Vaccine Education Module, OR. HEALTH AUTHORITY, http://healthoregon
.org/vaccineexemptionparents (last visited Oct. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B7XP-
HKTM]. Thus, parents are informed that “[v]accines protect the children who get
them, but they also help protect communities from diseases. Some people cannot get
vaccinated because of age or certain medical conditions . . . . If enough people in a
community are vaccinated, a disease has much harder time in spreading. So, even
people that can’t be vaccinated and babies may benefit if others are less likely to have
a disease to transmit to them.” Id.
67. See Act of Aug. 3, 2015, ch. 259, § 99, 2015 Ill. Laws 2791, 2795 (codified as
amended at 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-8.1(8) (2018).
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his or her parents or legal guardians present to the appropriate local
school authority a signed Certificate of Religious Exemption that de-
tails the grounds for objection and the specific immunizations they
object.68 The law further states that “[t]he certificate must also be
signed by [a] healthcare provider responsible for the performance of
the [immunization], confirming that the provider provided education
to the parent or legal guardian on the benefits of immunization and
the health risks to the student and the community of the communica-
ble diseases for which immunization is required in [Illinois].”69
The law in Washington states that a child shall be exempt, in whole
or in part, from immunization if he presents a written certification
signed by any of the individuals listed in the law, on a form prescribed
by the Department of Health, that the “religious beliefs of the
signator are contrary to immunization or that the signator has . . . a
philosophical or personal objection to the immunization of the child.70
The law further states that after July 22, 2011, the form must include a
statement signed by a health care practitioner indicating that he or she
provided the signator with information regarding the benefits and
risks of immunization to the child.71 The law does not specify what
benefits or risks should be discussed with a parent.72 However, a par-
ent signing the form declares that he or she understands that “exempt-
ing [the parent’s] children from any or all required vaccine(s) may
result in serious illness, disability, or death to [the parent’s] child or
others.”73
Arizona also requires an educational component in its exemption
process.74 Under Arizona law, the parent or guardian of a pupil re-
questing a personal or religious-beliefs exemption should submit a
signed statement to the school administrator stating that he or she has
received information regarding immunizations provided by the De-
partment of Health Services and that he or she understands the risks
and benefits of immunizations and the potential risks of non-immuni-
zation.75 The law in Arizona does not explicitly state that parents
68. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-8.1(8) (2018).
69. Id.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.210.090(1)(b)–(c) (2018).
71. Id. § 28A.210.090(2)(a). This form should not be presented if the child is ex-
empted because of religious beliefs and the parent or legal guardian demonstrates
membership in a religious body or a church in which the religious beliefs or teachings
of the church preclude a healthcare practitioner from providing medical treatment to
the child. Id. § 28A.210.090(2)(c).
72. See id. § 28A.210.090(2)(a).
73. Certificate of Exemption, WASH. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.wsd.wa.gov/wp-
content/uploads/Immunizations_CertificateofExemption.2017.pdf (last visited Oct.
18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X98A-JG3V]. On the other hand, the provider declares,
generally, that he/she discussed the benefits and risks of immunization with the par-
ent. Id.
74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §15-872(A)(1) (2014).
75. Id. §15-873. The educational component was part of the original law. See Act
of May 9, 1990, ch. 209, § 2, 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws 692, 694.
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should be informed about the benefits of vaccines to other individuals.
This information is also not explicitly mentioned in the exemption
forms provided to parents by the state of Arizona.76
Finally, according to Utah law, a parent asking for a vaccination
exemption should complete an online education module.77 The law
further states that a parent may decline to take the online education
module and obtain a vaccination exemption form from a local health
department if he or she requests and receives an in-person consulta-
tion at a local health department.78 Although the law specifies the in-
formation that should be provided to parents through the educational
module, it does not explicitly state that the social benefits of vaccina-
tion are part of the information.79 It must therefore be determined
whether the information provided to parents through the module will
address the social benefits of vaccines.
In summary, of the seven states that include in their exemption pro-
cess an educational component, four states explicitly obligate parents
to receive information regarding the social benefits of vaccination.
Another state briefly mentions in its exemption form but not in its
legislation that vaccination carries benefits for other individuals. The
two other states do not specify in their legislation or exemption forms
the specific information that must be shared with parents seeking an
exemption. In these latter two states, the decision of whether to pro-
vide parents information regarding the social benefits of vaccines is
76. See Religious Beliefs Exemption Form for Child Care, Preschool and Head
Start Programs, ARIZ. DEP’T HEALTH SERVS., http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/pre
paredness/epidemiology-disease-control/immunization/school-childcare/religious-be
lief-exemption.pdf (last updated July 1, 2013) [https://perma.cc/3RQX-UCBJ]; Per-
sonal Beliefs Exemption Form Kindergarten–12th Grade Only, ARIZ. DEP’T HEALTH
SERVS., http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/
immunization/school-childcare/personal-belief-exemption.pdf (last updated July 1,
2013) [https://perma.cc/Y2MZ-HDTA]. It should be noted that these forms refer par-
ents to additional information available at the local county health department and
Arizona Department of Health Services. See Arizona Immunization Program, ARIZ.
DEP’T HEALTH SERVS., https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-
control/immunization/index.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B8AC-
BU82]. Parents who seek further information through this website are further re-
ferred to the CDC’s Parent’s Guide to Immunizations. The guide includes the follow-
ing information: “However, the benefits of vaccinating your child also extend to other
children. As mentioned earlier, a small percentage of children fail to develop immu-
nity from vaccines. There are also children who can’t get certain vaccines for medical
or other reasons, and babies who are too young to be vaccinated. These children rely
on the immunity of people around them to protect them from infectious diseases. The
more children in a community who are vaccinated, the harder it is for a disease to
spread. And finally, getting vaccinated today will help protect future generations.”
Parent’s Guide to Childhood Immunizations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION 28 (Aug. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/tools/parents-guide/
downloads/parents-guide-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5Z5-HURC].
77. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-9-304(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
78. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-9-304(b)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018).
79. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-7-9.
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left for the judgment of local health services or the individual health-
care provider.
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above discussion. First,
an increasing number of states obligate parents to be educated regard-
ing the social benefits of vaccination as part of their exemption pro-
cess (or consider obligating parents to review educational material).
Because acting in solidarity is associated with awareness on the part of
the actor to the social benefits of his or her acts, this legislation may
be perceived as part of an effort to induce or educate parents to act in
solidarity. My finding that vaccination is perceived by public health
policy makers as an act of solidarity supports this conclusion. It fol-
lows that although the word “solidarity” is not explicitly mentioned in
the previously described laws, this legislation expresses the idea of sol-
idarity and encourages individuals to act in solidarity. Returning to
Prainsack and Buyx’s claim regarding the three tiers by which individ-
uals come to engage in practicing solidarity, this legislation seems to
combine between the first and third tiers. Although not obligating
parents to act in solidarity, it manifests the idea of solidarity through
legislation and adopts a mechanism with the aim to motivate parents
to practice solidarity at the interpersonal level. Second, although
adopting a similar obligation to be educated regarding the social bene-
fits of vaccination, the laws differ from one another regarding several
issues. Thus, there are differences regarding the content of informa-
tion: benefit to the community versus benefits to other individuals. In
Bierhoff and Kupper’s terms: framing solidarity as based on common
interest versus framing solidarity as based on the interests of other
individuals; or in Husted’s term: framing solidarity as group solidarity
versus framing it as moral solidarity. The measures through which in-
formation is provided to parents include face-to-face interactions,
written information or educational modules available on the net. Fi-
nally, the frequency of education includes temporary versus one-time
educational interaction.
The increase in the number of states obligating parents to be edu-
cated regarding the risks and benefits of vaccination, in general, and
of its social benefits, specifically, as well as states in which such an
option is considered is not surprising.
In recent years, a number of states have passed legislation or con-
sidered passing legislation to tighten their vaccine exemption require-
ments.80 This trend may be associated with three factors. The first
80. See Lobo, supra note 5, at 285–86; Rota et al., supra note 5, at 647. For exam-
ple, in California, personal and religious belief exemptions are not allowed. See Act of
June 30, 2015, ch. 35, 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1440 (West). In 2015, the law in Vermont
was amended to eliminate the philosophical convictions exemption, thus leaving only
the medical and religious exemptions in force. See Act of May 28, 2015, ch.37, § 4,
2015 Vt. Acts & Resolves 341, 345–46. Legal initiatives to eliminate religious and/or
philosophical belief exemptions to vaccination were also undertaken in other states.
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factor is the reoccurrence of diseases that had been declared eradi-
cated in the United States. In 2014 and 2015, the CDC documented
over 800 cases of measles in the United States, including a cluster of
117 cases linked to a California amusement park.81 In 2016, eighty-six
individuals in nineteen different states had measles, and from January
to May 20, 2017 alone, 100 cases of measles had been reported across
fifteen different states.82 Reports of pertussis peaked in 2012 with
48,277 cases reported to the CDC, twenty of which resulted in death.83
During 2014, the CDC received reports of 32,971 pertussis cases, a
15% increase from the 28,639 cases in 2013.84 The second factor is the
increase in the number of parents taking advantage of nonmedical ex-
emptions. This resulted in an increasing number of unvaccinated chil-
dren and an equivalent decline in childhood immunization rates in the
U.S. since 1990.85 The third factor is the accumulation of evidence for
the association between the frequency of vaccination exemptions or
vaccination refusals and the incidence of vaccine-preventable dis-
See, e.g., H.B. 1043, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); H.F. 261, 87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017).
81. See Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/8FTD-EKZ8].
82. Id.
83. See Pertussis Outbreak Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/pertussis/outbreaks/trends.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/A5C2-6LH7].
84. Id.
85. See Omer et al., supra note 6, at 1171; Figure Depicting Coverage with Individ-
ual Vaccines from the Inception of NIS, 1994 Through 2012, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/coverage/nis/child/
figures/2012-map.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2013) [https://perma.cc/7JTH-S583]. Al-
though childhood vaccination rates in the U.S. are at an overall high and exemption
rates have been relatively consistent since the 2011–12 school year, in 2016, the CDC
reported a national median exemption rate of 1.9%, which indicated a slight increase
from the previous school year (1.7%). In 2017, there was a national median exemp-
tion rate of 2%, which indicated another slight increase from the previous school year.
Moreover, from the 2015–16 to the 2016–17 school year, the exemption rate de-
creased by >1.0 percentage points only in two states (California and Vermont) and
increased by >0.5 percentage points in seven states (Alaska, Georgia, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin). In addition, among states
that reported exemptions by type in the 2016–17 school year, the median percentage
of nonmedical exemptions was 1.8% (range = 0.5% [DC] to 6.5% [Oregon]), com-
pared to 1.6% (range = 0.4% [DC] to 6.2% [Oregon]) in the previous year. Finally, it
was also indicated by the CDC that vaccination coverage varies within states, and
clusters of under-vaccinated kindergartners may exist in states with high overall rates.
See Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children in Kindergarten—
United States, 2015–16 School Year, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm6539a3.htm [https://per
ma.cc/AAJ4-VGM6]; Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage for Selected Vac-
cines, Exemption Rates, and Provisional Enrollment Among Children in Kindergar-
ten—United States, 2016–17 School Year, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6640a3
.htm [https://perma.cc/68GW-Z7V3].
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eases.86 Obligating parents to be educated regarding vaccines as part
of the exemption process was expected to decrease the number of par-
ents seeking an exemption and thus increase vaccination rates.87 This
assumption is supported by empirical findings. At least two studies
indicated that the level of difficulty of the exemption process affects
whether parents seek a nonmedical exemption. For example, a 2001
study shows that states with difficult exemption policies are more
likely to have a lower percentage of children with exemptions than
states with an easy exemption policy.88 The study indicates that the
complexity of the exemption process, that is, the time and effort re-
quired to obtain an exemption, has a direct effect on the number of
parents who seek exemptions to vaccination.89 Thus, it suggests that a
difficult exemption policy may discourage parents from seeking ex-
emptions for their children and vise-versa.90 This conclusion is sup-
ported by the findings of a second study, published in 2012. According
to this study, from 2005 to 2011, the rates of nonmedical exemptions
86. See, e.g., Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic Clustering of Nonmedical Exemp-
tions to School Immunization Requirements and Associations with Geographic Clus-
tering of Pertussis, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1389, 1395 (2008); Tracy A. Lieu et al.,
Geographic Clusters in Under Immunization and Vaccine Refusal, 135 PEDIATRICS
280, 288 (2015); Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis
in California, 2010, 132 PEDIATRICS 624, 627 (2013); Saad B. Omer et al., Vaccine
Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360
N. ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1984 (2009) [hereinafter Omer et al., Vaccine Refusal]; Aamer
Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of Pertussis in New
York State, 2000–2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 42 (2013); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedi-
cal Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Associa-
tion of State Policies With Pertussis Incidence, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1757, 1761
(2006); Jennifer Zipprich at al., Measles Outbreak—California, December 2014–Feb-
ruary 2015, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 20, 2015), https://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6406.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY4C-BNER]; Daniel A.
Salmon, et al., Health Consequence of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From
Immunization Laws: Individual and Social Risk of Measles, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
47, 49 (1999); Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and
Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 3145, 3147–48 (2000).
87. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions Certificate of Immunization Status (CIS)
and Certificate of Exemption (COE), WASH. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.doh.wa.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/348-472-ExemptionLawFAQs.pdf (last updated Feb. 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7BGC-KSGM]; Oregon Immunization Program, Oregon School and
Children’s Facility Immunization Law: Nonmedical Exemption Changes in Effect, as
of March 1, 2014, OR. PUB. HEALTH DIVISION 3, https://apps.state.or.us/Forms/
Served/le4684c.pdf (last updated May 2014) [https://perma.cc/SAL9-HGD3]; Non-
medical Waiver Rule for Childhood Immunization: Information for Schools and Child-
care, MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1 (July 6, 2018), http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/mdch/Waiver_Flyer_for_schools_and_childcare_Ctrs_478621_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RDA-NPF3]; School Immunizations, New Certificate of Religious
Exemption Requirement, ILL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2015), http://dph.illinois
.gov/news/school-immunizations-–-new-certificate-religious-exemption-requirement
[https://perma.cc/698J-RL7G].
88. Hooker, supra note 58, at 266.
89. See Rota et al., supra note 5, at 647.
90. See Hooker, supra note 58, at 267; Rota et al., supra note 5, at 647.
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in states with easy exemption policies were 2.31 times higher than the
rates in states with difficult exemption policies. By 2011, the nonmedi-
cal exemption rate in states with easy exemption criteria increased to
3.3%, an average annual increase of 13%. In contrast, nonmedical ex-
emption rates in states with difficult exemption criteria increased by
8% annually to 1.3% in 2011.91 Considering that the inclusion of an
educational component in the exemption process is expected to im-
pose considerable costs on parents (for example, arriving to the doc-
tor’s office, making the time required for the educational process, and
confronting the doctor), it is reasonable to assume that adding an obli-
gation to the exemption process might discourage parents from seek-
ing an exemption.
Empirical findings also suggest that parental vaccine refusal or hesi-
tancy is often associated with four factors: low perception of the sus-
ceptibility to the disease; low perception of the severity of the disease;
low perception of the effectiveness and efficiency of the vaccine; and
high risk perception of the side effects of vaccines.92 More specifically,
concerns regarding vaccine safety, regardless of whether they are sci-
entifically based, are one of the most common factors reported by par-
ents who decline vaccination for their children.93 At the same time,
empirical evidence suggests that parents who receive full and correct
information regarding vaccines become more supportive of vaccina-
tion.94 These findings support the assumption that educating parents
regarding the low risks and substantial benefits of vaccines through a
reliable source will refute parents’ wrongful perceptions regarding
vaccination and thus increase their willingness to vaccinate their
children.
As previously noted, this Article seeks to critically address one as-
pect of the educational process, providing parents information regard-
ing the social benefits of vaccination, which I will name the “solidarity
component” or “solidarity legislation.” It follows that the general
question of whether it is theoretically or empirically justified to adopt
a stricter exemption process or mandate parents to be educated about
91. Omer et al., supra note 6, at 1171. For other studies which support these find-
ings, see Daniel A. Salmon, Parental Vaccine Refusal in Wisconsin: A Case-Control
Study, 108 WIS. MED. J. 17, 17 (2008).
92. See Daniel A Salmon et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: Causes, Consequences, and a
Call to Action, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S391, S393 (2015); Omer et al., Vaccine
Refusal, supra note 86, at 1985; Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are
So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 353, 402–03 (2004).
93. See Salmon et al., supra note 92, at S393.
94. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Parents’ Responses to Vaccine Information Pam-
phlets, 93 PEDIATRICS 369, 371 (1994); see J. Leask, Vaccination and Risk Communi-
cation: Summary of a Workshop, Arlington, Virginia, USA, 5–6 October 2000, 38 J.
PEDIATRIC CHILD HEALTH 124, 126 (2002).
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vaccines is not addressed in this Article.95 Accordingly, the focus of
the discussion is the solidarity component as adopted in the previously
described legislation and its possible effects on parents’ vaccination
behavior. I will start by observing the expressive function of solidarity
legislation and its potential influence on vaccination behavior.
IV. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF SOLIDARITY LEGISLATION
A. Generally
The law influences the behavior of individuals in many ways. The
classic “Law & Economics” approach focuses almost exclusively on
deterrence as the mechanism through which legal rules influence
human behavior. According to this approach, by imposing sanctions,
the law increases the expected costs of the regulated activity and
thereby induces compliance.96
As the previous discussion suggests, this approach may be used to
explain and justify, at least in part, a rule that mandates parents to be
educated regarding vaccines’ social benefits. Mandating that parents
participate in an education process and specifically obligating them to
be educated regarding the social benefits of vaccines involves a sanc-
tion in the form of denying parents who do not comply with this re-
quirement the option of being exempted from vaccinating their
children. Considering the implications of this sanction, parents will
presumably be motivated to participate in the educational process and
thus be informed regarding the social benefits of vaccination. This ar-
gument further suggests that providing this information to parents
might motivate some parents to change their minds and vaccinate
their children.
I will analyze the correctness of this argument in the next part of the
Article. However, it is apparent that this argument relies heavily on
the deterrent effect of solidarity legislation on parents
However, a more general understanding of the function of this leg-
islation is possible and desirable. In recent decades, an increasing
body of legal scholarship has claimed that law has an expressive func-
tion independent of the effects of its sanctions.97 This view takes a
95. For an empirical study that found that adding a health care provider counsel-
ing and/or signature requirement for parents requesting immunization exemptions for
their children was associated with decreases in exemption rates, see Saad B. Omer et
al, Exemptions from Mandatory Immunization After Legally Mandated Parental
Counseling, 141 PEDIATRICS 1, 4 (2018).
96. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1603 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79
OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informa-
tive Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 964–73 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026–35 (1996) [hereinafter
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macro perspective on the role of law and presents it as a means to
stimulate changes in social norms or change the social meaning of a
particular behavior.98
According to this approach, the discussion should address the ex-
plicit and implicit statements included in solidarity legislation, rather
than the educational process it is expected to motivate in physician-
patient encounters or the sanctions created by it.
More specifically, under this approach, the discussion should ad-
dress the expressive function of legislation that explicitly states that
vaccines have social benefits and that incorporates implicit messages
regarding the behavior expected from parents (acting in solidarity).
The following discussion addresses this issue.
B. The Attitudinal Theory
Expressivist scholars claim that laws’ “statements” may change so-
cial norms and ultimately affect both the judgments and behaviors of
individuals. According to this understanding, the law “expressively,”
and thus indirectly, influences the behavior of individuals by what it
says rather than by creating incentives through sanctions.99
Scholars present several mechanisms through which the expressive
function of law operates and affects behavior other than through legal
sanctions. In his paper, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, Mc-
Adams claimed that the law affects behavior by signaling which be-
haviors are approved or disapproved (esteemed or disesteemed) by
members of society.100 He posited that individuals experience disap-
proval as a cost and approval as a benefit. As a result, the belief that
other individuals generally disapprove of a behavior makes that be-
havior costlier, at least if there is a risk that other individuals will de-
tect the behavior. In contrast, the belief that other individuals
generally approve of a behavior makes the behavior less costly (or
more beneficial). One implication of McAdams’s theory is that one
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953–55 (1996); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change The-
ory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 44 (2002); Scott, supra note 96, at 1647;
Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Section?,
19 UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF L. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY, Working Paper No.
138, 2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID452420_code98588
.pdf?abstractid=452420&mirid=1 [http://perma.cc/EZ3Z-GM6G].
98. See Scott, supra note 96, at 1622; Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of
Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1384–85; Yuval Feldman, The
Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Motivation and
Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 178 n.3 (2009).
99. McAdams, supra note 97, at 339; Sunstein, On the Expressive Function, supra
note 97, at 2025–26; Scott, supra note 96, at 1603–04; Richard H. McAdams & Eric B.
Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1573, 1589
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley
Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 84 (2007).
100. McAdams, supra note 97, at 340.
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can change an individual’s behavior merely by changing his or her be-
liefs about what others approve or disapprove. Accordingly, McAd-
ams further claims that through signaling that a specific behavior is
desirable, the law can influence individuals’ behavior merely by caus-
ing them to update their beliefs regarding the approval patterns.101
More specifically, McAdams claims that the attitudinal theory has
three components. First, it assumes that individuals’ behavior is moti-
vated, in part, by what they believe other individuals will approve or
disapprove.102 The motivating power of approval may arise because
the individual values approval for its own sake or as an instrument for
achieving some other end.103 Second, it assumes that individuals have
imperfect information regarding what other individuals approve and
that their beliefs regarding these matters are frequently mistaken.104
Third, democratically-produced legislative outcomes are positively
correlated with popular attitudes and therefore provide a signal of
these attitudes. Therefore, legislative signals may influence behavior
independent of the sanctions they impose.105
When applied to the case of vaccination, the attitudinal theory sug-
gests that the explicit and implicit statements included in solidarity
legislation signal to parents that considering vaccination’s social bene-
fits and acting in solidarity when making vaccination decisions re-
present an approved and esteemed behavior by members of the
society. On the other hand, ignoring the social implications of nonvac-
cination and not acting in solidarity are behaviors disapproved by so-
ciety. According to the attitudinal theory, providing these signals to
parents is expected to encourage them to consider the social implica-
tions of their decision regarding vaccination and motivate them to
vaccinate their child.106
However, a closer examination of these propositions raises doubts
as to their correctness. For this purpose, a distinction between two
groups of parents is in place. The first group represents parents who




105. Id. at 340; Sunstein, On the Expressive Function, supra note 97, at 2033.
106. Dewesh Kumar et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: Understanding Better to Address Bet-
ter, 5 ISR. J. HEALTH POL’Y RES. 1, 4 (2016). These conclusions are supported by
empirical studies that indicate cooperation positively correlates with punitive atti-
tudes vis-a`-vis defectors in different contexts, including vaccination. See Shahzeen Z.
Attari et al., Reasons for Cooperation and Defection in Real-World Social Dilemmas,
9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 316, 325 (2014). Thus, it has been reported that
parents’ intentions to vaccinate against Hepatitis B were significantly greater when
presented with the beliefs that most friends would vaccinate, individuals important to
the parents favored vaccination, and these important individuals would appreciate the
parents’ decision to vaccinate. See John Romley et al., National Survey Indicates that
Individual Vaccination Decisions Respond Positively to Community Vaccination Rates,
11 PLOS ONE 1, 7 (2016).
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are members of a close-knit group107 in which the social norm is to
refuse vaccination108 and parents who object to vaccination based on
philosophical, moral or other strongly held attitudes.109 The second
group includes hesitant parents110 and free-rider parents.111
107. “A close-knit group is a network in which power is broadly distributed and
information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among network members.
Typically, close-knit groups are comprised of repeat players who can identify one an-
other.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitzt, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 359 (2003).
108. Examples of vaccine-averse groups include Christian Scientists, the Amish,
Orthodox Protestant, and Orthodox Jews. These groups are often also close-knit
groups. The aversion of religious groups toward vaccination may be driven by relig-
ious reasons, safety concerns, tradition, or simply custom. See John D. Grabenstein,
What the World’s Religions Teach, Applied to Vaccines and Immune Globulins, 31
VACCINE 2011, 2015, 2019 (2013) (Christian Scientists); Wilhelmina L.M. Ruijs et al.,
The Role of Religious Leaders in Promoting Acceptance of Vaccination Within A Mi-
nority Group: A Qualitative Study, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 511, 512 (2013); Wilhel-
mina L. M. Ruijs et al., How Orthodox Protestant Parents Decide on the Vaccination
of Their Children: A Qualitative Study, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 408, 409 (2012) (Ortho-
dox Protestants); Olivia K. Wenger et al., Underimmunization in Ohio’s Amish: Pa-
rental Fears Are a Greater Obstacle Than Access to Care, 128 PEDIATRICS 79, 80
(2011) (Amish); Asher Bush, Vaccination in Halakha and in Practice in the Orthodox
Jewish Community, 13 .HAKIRAH 185, 186 (2012) (Orthodox Jews).
109. See Jessica Smartt Gullion et al., Deciding to Opt Out of Childhood Vaccina-
tion Mandates, 25 PUB. HEALTH NURSING 401, 402 (2008). For example, a preference
for natural parenting or natural-living philosophy characterized by a distrust of West-
ern medicine and a penchant to pursue alternative therapies for medical ailments. See
id.
110. See Eve Dube´ et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: An Overview, 9 HUM. VACCINES &
IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1763, 1764 (2013). Despite the increasing number of articles
that refer to vaccine hesitancy published in recent years, there are discrepancies
among publications regarding what exactly falls under the umbrella of “vaccine hesi-
tancy.” Id. For the purpose of this Article, I will use the definition presented by Kes-
tenbaum and Feemster: “Hesitant individuals are a heterogeneous group who hold
varying degrees of indecision about specific vaccines or vaccination in general. Along
this spectrum of indecision, there is a range of vaccine uptake, depending on addi-
tional influences that move an individual toward or away from ultimately accepting a
particular vaccine.” Lori A. Kestenbaum & Kristen A. Feemster, Identifying and Ad-
dressing Vaccine Hesitancy, 44 PEDIATRIC ANNALS e71, e72 (2015). The causes of
vaccine hesitancy are various and are influenced by multiple factors. These factors
include parental specific characteristics, such as knowledge regarding vaccination and
information sources; parents’ previous experiences with vaccine preventable diseases;
family histories; feelings of control; and relationship with the healthcare providers and
the public health system. See id. at e73-e75; Dube´ et al, supra note 110, at 1765–70.
Other causes include community-level factors, such as social norms, media, and vac-
cine policy. Dube´ et al, supra note 110, at 1765–67. Although some scholars include
parents who hold strong attitudes against vaccination in this category, I will refer to
these parents as a separate category.
111. Alison M Buttenheim & David A. Asch, Making Vaccine Refusal Less of a
Free Ride, 9 HUM. VACCINES IMMUNOTHEAPEUTICS 2674, 2674 (2013). Free-rider par-
ents are parents who rely on herd immunity to provide their children protection from
infection. Id. Herd immunity is considered a public good. Id. It is both non-excludable
(which indicates there is no way to exclude individuals from using it) and non-
rivalrous (which indicates that one individual’s use does not limit or restrict other
individuals’ use). Similar to other public goods, such as national defense, herd immu-
nity is vulnerable to the “free rider” problem. Id.; Carolina Betsch et. al., Using Be-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 24 15-FEB-19 10:19
368 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
This argument requires an explanation. The attitudinal theory as-
sumes that individuals care whether other individuals approve or dis-
approve of their behavior. As this theory suggests, social disapproval
is expected to affect individuals’ behavior only to the extent they
value the esteem and respect of other individuals in the community. It
further posits that individuals also consider the amount and quality of
social disapproval attached to a behavior, which together present the
social costs112 attached to this behavior, the social benefits expected
from changing one’s behavior, and the private costs involved in each
course of behavior (for example, the risks involved in vaccination).113
Following these assumptions, two propositions are in place. First, it
is questionable whether parents who are members of a vaccine-averse,
close-knit group will be motivated to change their behavior by legisla-
tion signaling that consideration of vaccination’s social benefits and
acting in solidarity represent an approved and esteemed behavior by
members of the society.114 Individuals do not attach the same value to
out-group disapproval or approval as they attach to in-group disap-
proval or approval.115 Moreover, in the case of close-knit groups,
changing behavior and vaccinating a child may expose parents to a
severe in-group condemnation or cause them to experience guilt for
violating the norms of their community. It follows that, for these par-
ents, the informal social sanctions involved in changing behavior or
the self-imposed sanction of guilt might result in higher costs than the
costs involved in keeping with the practice accepted in their commu-
nity.116 Therefore, as long as their close-knit community refuses to
change its norms regarding vaccination, these parents are expected to
stick to their refusal to vaccinate their children even in the presence of
havioral Insights to Increase Vaccination Policy Effectiveness, 2 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 61, 64 (2015).
112. Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 97, at 2. The phrases “social costs” and
“social benefits” used in the above text express the social responses attached to a
behavior, for example, condemnation, stigma, exclusion, praises, and improving one’s
social status.
113. For a similar line of reasoning, see Geisinger & Stein, supra note 99, at 85.
114. For a similar claim, see Kestenbaum & Feemster, supra note 110, at e74.
115. Strategic models of intergroup bias have provided evidence that concerns
about reputation lead to greater in-group altruism. See Leor M. Hackel et al., Social
Identity Shapes Social Valuation: Evidence From Prosocial Behavior and Vicarious
Reward, 12 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1219, 1219 (2017).
116. Members of close-knit groups are particularly responsive to social norms be-
cause their dependence on each other makes them value their reputation and social
status and the costs of obtaining and exchanging information regarding members are
low. See Strahilevitzt, supra note 107, at 360. For a more general discussion about the
power of social sanctioning in different social settings, see, for example: Rachel I.
McDonald & Christian S. Crandall, Social Norms and Social Influence, 3 CURRENT
OPINION BEHAV. SCI. 147 (2015); Rob M. A. Nelissen & Laetitia B. Mulder, What
Makes a Sanction “Stick”? The Effects of Financial and Social Sanctions on Norm
Compliance, 8 SOC. INFLUENCE 70 (2013); Andrew L Spivak et al., Religiosity, Delin-
quency, and the Deterrent Effects of Informal Sanctions, 32 SOC. & CRIMINOLOGY
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS 103 (2011).
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legislated signals for solidarity. The same is also true for parents who
object to vaccination based on philosophical, moral, or other strongly
held attitudes.117 These parents may perceive the costs of vaccination,
for example, exposing their child to vaccination risks, as substantially
higher than the cost of social disapproval involved in not vaccinating
him.118
Second, the chance that hesitant parents and free riders will change
their behavior in response to a legislated signal regarding solidarity
seems greater than the chance presented by the first group. These par-
ents often do not hold strong beliefs against vaccination. They only act
out of personal payoff.119 Moreover, although influenced by close so-
cial networks,120 they are not typically severely sanctioned by their
community for changing their minds and deciding to vaccinate their
children. It is therefore possible that these parents will be more re-
sponsive to the social disapproval involved in not vaccinating a child.
However, even then, the extent to which these parents will be respon-
sive to informal sanctions depends, among other things, on their per-
ception of the possible payoff of vaccination versus nonvaccination.
This comparison will typically be based on parents’ perceptions re-
garding the following issues: the possibility of social disapproval, that
is, the perceived risk that their decision not to vaccinate their child
will be made known to other individuals; the nature of the expected
social disapproval and its extent;121 the susceptibility to the disease;
the severity of the disease; the risks and efficiency of the vaccine; and
the financial costs associated with vaccination versus disease infec-
tion (for example, expenses for infection treatment and absence from
work).122 Free-rider parents will also consider the perceived vaccina-
tion rates in their community, that is, their evaluation of whether their
117. P. Wesley Schultz et al., Normative, Beliefs as Agents of Influence: Basic
Processes and Real-World Applications, in ATTITUDES AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 385,
404 (William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin eds., 2008). For the claim that having a
strong attitude toward the behavior may reduce or reverse the direction of normative
social influence. Id.
118. For a similar claim, see Jesse Singal, Why Shaming Anti-Vaxxers Won’t Work,
CUT (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/02/why-shaming-anti-vaxxers-wont-
work.html [https://perma.cc/56MW-MLAK].
119. This part of the discussion ignores the potential effects of other considerations
on the behavior of parents, for example, the desire to conform to others. These issues
will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
120. Emily K. Brunson, The Impact of Social Networks on Parents’ Vaccination De-
cisions, 131 PEDIATRICS e1397, e1397, e1401–02 (2013).
121. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 361–62 (1997). McAdams specifically noted the risk that the
deviation from the consensus will be detected and publicized, through gossip or other
informal or formal means, as a key element of the attitudinal theory. Id. at 361–62 &
n.100.
122. See Shang Xia & Jiming Liu, A Computational Approach to Characterizing the
Impact of Social Influence on Individuals’ Vaccination Decision Making, 8 PLOS
ONE e60373, 360373 (2013).
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children are protected from infection through herd immunity. Thus,
hesitant parents who perceive vaccine risks as high, vaccine benefits as
poor, and the possibility of serious social condemnation as moderate
might prefer to carry the costs of being socially condemned and re-
frain from vaccination, and vice versa. Free riders who perceive vacci-
nation rates in their community as high, vaccine side effects as high,
and the possibility of serious social condemnation as low might also
prefer the option of nonvaccination. It follows that the response of
hesitant or free rider parents to legal signals regarding solidarity might
change depending on their perceptions of the previously described
issues.
C. The Informational Theory
While the attitudinal theory focuses on social forces as an external
mechanism through which the expressive function of the law may in-
fluence behavior, other theories stress the law’s expressive power to
change individuals’ inner beliefs or perceptions. One of these theories
is the informational theory presented by McAdams and Dharmapala.
In their work, the authors claimed that another way by which the law
works expressively is by providing information to individuals regard-
ing the benefits and risks of the relevant activity and thus enabling
them to update their own beliefs regarding the regulated behavior.123
This mechanism relies on the process by which legislation is produced.
More specifically, it stresses the capacity of legislatures (in certain cir-
cumstances) to aggregate information and thus create information su-
perior to that possessed by any individual. In these circumstances, a
rational individual may change his or her beliefs regarding the subject
of the legislation, even if the legislature has no greater expertise on
the issue than the citizenry.124 McAdams and Dharmapala further
claim that updating individuals’ beliefs may have two effects. One
type is an “educational effect,” by which individuals directly decide to
change their own primary behavior. The second type is the “norm ef-
fect.” In these cases, the updating of beliefs causes individuals to ex-
pend greater effort to selfishly enforce the norm, thereby influencing
the primary behavior of other individuals. In each of these cases, law
works expressively: By informing citizens, it influences behavior inde-
pendent of the deterrence that legal sanctions generate.125
123. See RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES
AND LIMITS 136 (2015). This information should be distinguished from information
regarding the attitudes of other individuals towards the relevant behavior. See id. at
136–38. Although information regarding attitudes informs individuals whether others
disapprove or approve of the behavior, this type of information relates to actual fea-
tures of reality. See id.
124. See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 97, at 3.
125. See id. at 6. See also Sunstein, On the Expressive Function, supra note 97, at
2035 (for a similar line of argument).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 27 15-FEB-19 10:19
2019] ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF SOLIDARITY 371
Applying informational theories to the case of vaccination suggests
that including explicit messages regarding the social benefits of vac-
cines in vaccination laws might increase the willingness of hesitant
parents and parents who object to vaccination to vaccinate their chil-
dren. Parental hesitancy has been associated with the holding of inac-
curate information, confusion, uncertainty, and ambiguity regarding
the risks and benefits of vaccination.126 Under these circumstances,
parents might be led to indecision or refusal to make decisions, with-
out holding strong attitudes against vaccination.127 Parental objection
to vaccination has also been connected to the holding of inaccurate
information regarding the susceptibility to the disease, its severity, and
vaccine efficiency. Thus, it has been shown that parents who do not
vaccinate their children think that their children are unlikely to con-
tract infectious diseases and that infections are unlikely to be trans-
mitted to their child.128 Other individuals seem to think that vaccine-
preventable diseases are not that severe and may be easily treated.129
There are parents who believe that natural immunity, which is ac-
quired through being infected with the disease, is preferable to vac-
cine-induced immunity.130 In addition, parents with a low perception
of the disease often believe that the likelihood of negative conse-
quences of vaccination is high and that these consequences are more
severe than contracting the disease.131
Although these data mainly refer to parents’ misconceptions and
uncertainty regarding the risks and benefits of vaccinating their child,
holding inaccurate information or being confused regarding these is-
126. See, e.g., Daniel Brieger et al., Knowledge, Attitudes and Opinions Towards
Measles and the MMR Vaccine Across Two NSW Cohorts, 41 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PUB.
HEALTH 641, 643645 (2017); Salmon et al., supra note 92, at S392–93; Omer et al.,
Vaccine Refusal, supra note 86, at 1985; Calandrillo, supra note 92, at 402–03; Irene A.
Harmsen et al., Why Parents Refuse Childhood Vaccination: A Qualitative Study Us-
ing Online Focus Groups, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1183, 1185–87 (2013); Allison M.
Kennedy et al., Vaccine Beliefs of Parents Who Oppose Compulsory Vaccination, 120
PUB. HEALTH REP. 252, 256 (2005); Anat Gesser-Edelsburg et al., Why Do Parents
Who Usually Vaccinate Their Children Hesitate or Refuse? General Good vs. Individ-
ual Risk, 19 J. RISK RES. 405, 419–21 (2014). Several factors are responsible for par-
ents’ misconceptions and confusion regarding vaccination: the use of unprofessional
and unscientific sources of information, such as family members, friends, or the in-
ternet, where inaccurate information and unsubstantiated stories regarding vaccines
are present; the increasing number of informational sources regarding vaccination,
which often provide parents with contradictory pieces of information; and the success-
ful reduction in infectious disease rates and the prevention of epidemics in states with
persistently high vaccination coverage. For a detailed discussion regarding the causes
for parents’ misconceptions and confusion regarding vaccination, see Nili Karako-
Eyal, Increasing Vaccination Rates Through Tort Law: Theoretical and Empirical In-
sights, 86 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1921 (2017).
127. Betsch et al., supra note 111, at 65.
128. Harmsen et al., supra note 126, at 1186; Kennedy et al, supra note 126, at 256.
129. Harmsen et al., supra note 126, at 1186.
130. Id.; Kennedy et al., supra note 126, at 256.
131. Harmsen et al., supra note 126, at 1186.
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sues affects parents’ perceptions regarding the social implications of
vaccination. For example, a parent may be confused regarding the risk
that their child will infect other individuals if not vaccinated, the se-
verity of the disease to other individuals if infected by their child, and
the effectiveness of vaccination in preventing epidemics.
According to the informational theory, providing information to
parents regarding the benefits of vaccines to other individuals and the
community through vaccination legislation will enable them to update
their beliefs regarding the social implications of the decision of
whether to vaccinate their child. Knowing the legislature’s assessment,
parents will have a reliable, supportive reference point with which
they can interpret information and identify misleading information.
As a result, parents’ uncertainty may be reduced and parental miscon-
ceptions corrected. Thus, as far as parental hesitancy and objection to
vaccination is associated with the holding of inaccurate information or
confusion regarding the benefits and risks of vaccination, such legisla-
tion may increase vaccination rates.
Nevertheless, four covenants are in place. First, the previously de-
scribed proposition is based on two assumptions: (1) provision of ac-
curate information to parents is expected to increase vaccination
rates; and (2) knowledge regarding the social benefits of vaccination is
expected to induce parents to vaccinate their children. However, the
correctness of these assumptions should be examined. This issue will
be addressed in the next part of the Article. Second, as previously
noted, McAdams and Dharmapala claimed that rational individuals
may change their beliefs regarding the subject of the legislation be-
cause of the capacity of legislatures to aggregate information and thus
create information superior to that possessed by an individual. This
claim seems of special force in the case of vaccination considering that
legislatures have greater expertise on the subject than the citizenry.
However, attention should be given to findings that indicate vaccina-
tion refusal or hesitancy is often associated with distrust in official
state authorities.132 When this is the case, parents may perceive infor-
mation provided to the public by the legislature as untrue.133 Third, it
is questionable whether the educational effect of legislation as previ-
ously described will induce free riders to change their behavior and
vaccinate their children. Parents that knowingly free ride herd immu-
132. Heather M.R. Ames et al., Parents’ and Informal Caregivers’ Views and Exper-
iences of Communication About Routine Childhood Vaccination: A Synthesis of Qual-
itative Evidence, COCHRANE LIBR. 20–21 (2017), https://www.cochranelibrary.com/
cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD011787.pub2/media/CDSR/CD011787/CD011787.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NE3-BD3H]; Fabio Petrelli et al., Vaccine Hesitancy, A Public
Health Problem, 30 ANN. IG. 86, 91 (2018); Sarah E Williams, What are the Factors
that Contribute to Parental Vaccine-Hesitancy and What Can We Do About It?, 10
HUMAN VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2584, 2585 (2014).
133. For the claim that the informational function of the law is conditioned on pub-
lic trust in governmental agents, see Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 97, at 6.
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nity are aware of the social benefits of vaccination. In fact, they rely
on them. As far as they are concerned, what might lead to a change of
behavior is correcting misconceptions regarding vaccination rates in
the community, as far as misconceptions exist, and educating others
with respect to the possibility that herd immunity will be lost if the
number of parents refusing to vaccinate increases. Fourth, using legis-
lation, which is an outside source, to provide parents information re-
garding the social benefits of vaccination might not have an
educational effect in another case: parents who belong to a close-knit
community. These parents are highly influenced by the perceptions
and beliefs that are common in their community. Therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether legislation in and of itself, which is an outside source
of information, will have an influence on their perceptions and beliefs
regarding vaccination. In these cases, other methods of providing in-
formation to the community and changing their perceptions regarding
vaccination might be more efficient. These methods will be discussed
in the next part.
D. Theories of Coordination
Like McAdams and Dharmapala, Cooter was also interested in the
way law, through its expressive function, changes individuals’ inner
perceptions about the behavior itself and not only the way they be-
have. According to Cooter, an individual will internalize a norm when
doing so will provide a Pareto self-improvement134—that is, when it
makes the person better off as measured by the old preferences and
the new preferences.135 Law, in turn, creates opportunities for Pareto
self-improvements two ways. First, adopting a legal duty allows the
state to increase an individual’s willingness to undertake the specific
duty as an expression of his or her civic virtue. More specifically, ac-
cording to Cooter, a law may change an individual’s behavior because
of his or her desire to be seen by other individuals as a cooperator.
Second, individuals who believe they should obey the law (in general)
may internalize the (specific) behavioral obligation embodied in a par-
ticular law.136 Cooter further claimed that out of this process, an indi-
vidual with a new and different view of the behavior will emerge.137
134. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Anal-
ysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1592–94 (2000) [hereinafter Cooter,
Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens].
135. Thus, Cooter claimed that a rational individual internalizes a norm when com-
mitment conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed
preferences. See Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Con-
trol and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 904–05
(1998); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585,
585–86 (1998) [hereinafter Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics].
136. See Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, supra note 135, at 593.
137. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens, supra note 134, at 1581, 1597–98;
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, supra note 135, at 586.
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At this point, two results may follow. First, to the extent that citizens
internalize the legal rule and are deterred by the prospect of guilt, the
law may have self-sanctioning (or third-order) effects.138 Second, if
enough individuals adopt the new behavior, a tipping point may be
reached, and a new equilibrium entrenched. In this way, law can
change social norms.139
When applied to the case of vaccination, Cooter’s theory suggests
that solidarity legislation might induce parents who believe they
should obey the law or who want to be seen by other individuals as
cooperators to internalize the explicit and implicit behavioral obliga-
tions embodied in the legislation. Thus, they may consider the social
benefits of vaccination when deciding whether to vaccinate their child
and act in solidarity.
Though Cooter’s theory may affect some hesitant parents, the the-
ory’s applicability is uncertain with parents in close-knit communities
that refuse vaccination out of social norm and parents with strongly
held attitudes toward vaccination such as philosophical or moral ob-
jections. Similar to other individuals, parents who are members of a
close-knit community want to be viewed by others as cooperators.
Nevertheless, these “others” will most likely be members of the com-
munity they belong to. For these parents, the Pareto self-improvement
option is not vaccinating their child, considering that acting in this way
will mark them as cooperators in the eyes of members of their com-
munity. Parents that hold strong beliefs against vaccination are also
not expected to think that acting in solidarity in the context of vacci-
nation will make them better off as measured by their old preferences.
Although acting in this way may signal to other individuals that they
are cooperators, these parents may estimate the costs of vaccination
(for example, the risks involved in vaccination) as higher than the ex-
pected benefit from changing preference (being viewed by other indi-
viduals as cooperators). When this is the case, internalizing the norm
included in the legislation is not expected to present an opportunity to
Pareto self-improvement.
Other scholars are also interested in the way law may create equi-
libria around new behavior. In his article, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, McAdams claims that the law works expressively by
destabilizing existing equilibria and providing new focal points for the
creation of equilibria around new behaviors. Once a new legal rule is
adopted, it provides individuals with a basis for questioning whether
the past behavior of other individuals continues to apply to future
play, and they will no longer simply embrace the traditional equilib-
rium. Similar to Cooter, McAdams stresses the issue of coordination,
claiming that by making certain outcomes focal, the law creates expec-
138. Scott, supra note 96, at 1604.
139. See Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens, supra note 134, at 1588–87;
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, supra note 135, at 585–86.
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tations among individuals that others will play the strategies associ-
ated with the newly focal equilibrium. Once expectations exist, they
are self-fulfilling. That is, even if the payoffs remain the same, every-
one prefers to play their best response to the equilibrium they expect
everyone to reach to avoid the higher costs of an unsolved conflict.140
McAdams further claims that the focal point theory is broad and that
his assertions are true for many parts of life.141 Nevertheless, he also
claims that the scope of this theory is limited to cases in which the
situation includes an element of coordination. Therefore, when no co-
ordination is needed, the theory does not apply.142 Moreover, for the
theory to work, the parties to the conflict should share an interest in
avoiding unresolved conflicts because while each side prefers to get its
way, each side considers escalating the conflict as the worst out-
come.143 Therefore, “if an individual has a dominant strategy—best no
matter what the other individual does—then he is beyond the influ-
ence of a focal point.”144 McAdams further claims that the success of a
focal point theory is also conditioned in the absence of more powerful
focal points.145
While the theory of focal points is relevant to the case of vaccina-
tion, a detailed discussion exceeds the boundaries of this Article. Nev-
ertheless, several initial observations may be useful for the current
discussion.
As previously noted, herd immunity is required for the protection
of individuals who cannot be vaccinated because of medical condi-
tions, children who are too young to be vaccinated, young children
who did not complete the recommended childhood immunization
schedule, and vaccinated individuals who did not develop protective
responses to vaccines (vaccine failure). For this purpose, the overall
immunization rates should reach a critical threshold. These findings
lead to three conclusions. First, considering that a sufficient number of
individuals should be vaccinated for a herd immunity to be achieved,
coordinating the behavior of individuals is important in the case of
vaccination. Second, as the number of nonvaccinated children in-
creases, there is a risk that vaccination rates will fall below the thresh-
old, and a conflict between the previously discussed groups of parents
140. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1663–72, (2000); McAdams, supra note 123, at 62. For a similar line of
argument, see Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Why People Obey The Law: Experi-
mental Evidence From The Provision of Public Goods, 5–6 (CESifo Working Paper
No. 651, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID290231_code01111
1670.pdf?abstractid=290231&mirid=1 [https://perma.cc/U8S5-3QKA].
141. See McAdams, supra note 123, at 29, 82.
142. See id. at 62.
143. Id. at 82.
144. Id. at 92.
145. Id. at 62. He also indicated that for the theory to work, the law must be suffi-
ciently clear and sufficiently public. For discussion, I will assume that these conditions
are fulfilled in the case of solidarity legislation.
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and non-vaccinators may emerge. Third, considering that free riders
rely on the protection provided to their children by herd immunity, a
conflict may arise among free rider parents themselves and between
free-rider parents and other nonvaccinating parents. Each parent will
prefer that other parents vaccinate their children to ensure herd im-
munity will be achieved and his or her child will be protected while
carrying no risks. Fourth, because nonvaccination may result in
epidemics and thus increase healthcare costs,146 a conflict may arise
between nonvaccinating parents whose behavior increases the chances
for epidemic outbreaks and parents who vaccinate their children who
will have to bear the costs of an outbreak.147 Finally, the fact that any
child may experience a vaccination failure and thus be exposed to risk
of infection provides another reason for vaccinating parents to be in
conflict with nonvaccinating parents. It follows that childhood vacci-
nation creates a need for coordination; therefore, it is a case for which
the focal point theory might be applicable.
As previously noted, for the theory to work, each side of the con-
flict should consider an escalating the conflict to be the worst out-
come. This proposition suggests that the focal-point effect of solidarity
legislation is expected to be limited when the non-vaccinators are free
riders. Free-rider parents will have an interest in avoiding the previ-
ously described conflicts only if they believe that vaccination rates are
about to fall below the threshold, with the result that they not being
protected by herd immunity. Moreover, as long as free-rider parents
believe that they are protected by herd immunity, they are beyond the
influence of the focal point theory: They are best regardless of how
other individuals behave.
The influence of the focal point theory is also questionable in the
case of parents who hold strong beliefs against vaccination. As previ-
ously discussed, there is a reason to believe that these parents will
continue to hold inaccurate information regarding the benefits of vac-
cinations in preventing epidemics and protecting other individuals,
even in the presence of solidarity laws. Holding these misconceptions,
they will not have an incentive to change their behavior and vaccinate
their children to avoid the described conflicts. For them, the conflict is
not the result of their acting according to the old equilibrium; it is the
result of misconceptions held by other parents.148 To put it in another
146. For the connection between outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases and
healthcare costs, see Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States,
2001–2010, supra note 41.
147. Nonvaccinating parents will also have to bear these costs. However, consider-
ing that these parents often hold inaccurate information regarding the benefits and
importance of vaccination, it is reasonable to assume that they will underestimate the
potential of vaccines to prevent these costs, as well as the probability of epidemic
outbreaks.
148. For the claim that one reason for non-cooperation is disbelief in the social
benefits of cooperation, see Attari et al., supra note 106, at 316–17.
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way, for these parents, the conflict is not “real”; it is the result of mis-
taken information held by other parents.
Parents who hold strong beliefs against vaccination are not ex-
pected to change their behavior for another reason: the existence of
more powerful competing focal points. This is also true for parents
who belong to a close-knit community where the norm is nonvaccina-
tion. McAdams pointed to customary behaviors or social movements
that oppose the new law as potential sources for competitive focal
points. The application of this observation to the case of vaccination
suggests that there is a non-negligible chance that powerful competing
focal points exist. Thus, in close-knit communities, a long tradition
and well-established custom of nonvaccination might present a more
powerful competing point then the one created by law. Other compet-
ing points might be created by anti-vaccination movements, in re-
sponse to solidarity legislation, by publicly challenging the claim that
there are social benefits to vaccination.149 These alternative expres-
sions may often be louder than the expression included in the legisla-
tion. Moreover, individuals often select an expression included in
legislation as the one they will use to coordinate their behavior be-
cause of its legitimacy.150 However, as previously noted, parents who
strongly oppose vaccination often distrust the legislature and prefer
other sources of expressions.
Other scholars claim that law’s coordinating effect stems from its
ability to improve cooperation by activating the norm of conditional
cooperation.151 Conditional cooperation is defined as a subject’s will-
ingness to contribute to a public good when other individuals also con-
tribute or are expected to do so.152 It may be considered a motivation
in its own or “a consequence of some fairness preferences like ‘altru-
ism[,]’ ‘warm-glow[,]’ ‘inequity aversion[,]’ or ‘reciprocity.’”153 Other
scholars suggest that the psychological motive behind conditional co-
operation may be that unconditional cooperation entails the risk of
being exploited by free riders or point to the simple desire of individu-
als to avoid being different.154
149. For a similar example, see McAdams, supra note 123, at 123.
150. See id. at 124.
151. See Tyran & Feld, supra note 140, at 5.
152. Todd Cherry et al., Conditional Cooperation on Three Continents, 101 ECON.
LETTERS 175, 175 (2008); Peter Martinsson et al., Conditional Cooperation: Evidence
for the Role of Self-Control 3 (Univ. of Gothenburg Sch. of Bus., Econ. & Law, Work-
ing Paper No. 459, 2010), https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/23048/4/gupea_2077_
23048_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6V2-TWYT].
153. Urs Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from
A Public Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 397 (2001).
154. See Robin Cubitt et al., Conditional Cooperation and Betrayal Aversion, 141 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 110, 111 (2017); Elizabeth Bodine-Baron et al., Conforming
and Non-Conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19528, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w195
28.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ8G-QR34].
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The existence and extent of conditional cooperation are well-docu-
mented in the economics literature on public goods provision, and
have been shown to be a robust behavioral regularity in economic ex-
periments.155 More specifically, “empirical evidence from lab and field
studies shows that (i) many people are to some extent willing to pro-
vide public goods voluntarily and (ii) those who are willing to do so
are mostly ‘conditional cooperators,’ that is, they contribute to the
public good only if they expect other group members to do so as
well.”156
While the activation of conditional cooperation may be relatively
easy in small communities, it is more difficult in larger communities
(such as states with millions of inhabitants). In large communities, ex-
pectations regarding how fellow citizens are going to behave may be
an important determinant of behavior. As lawmaking is supposed to
play a significant role in regulating behavior in large groups and be-
cause it incorporates direct public expression of the appropriate be-
havior, it may change individuals’ expectations regarding what others
will do and thus indirectly induce conditional cooperation.157
The application of this theory to the case of vaccination suggests
parents are more likely to vaccinate their children when informed that
community vaccination rates are high, considering their desire to con-
form to the norms of their community.158 This theoretical proposal
finds support in empirical literature that consistently points to positive
peer effects in vaccination decision-making. This literature suggests
that conditional cooperation is an active motive in the case of
vaccination.159
However, several comments are in place. First, scholars across the
social sciences have long noted the inherent fragility of voluntary co-
operation as a result of free rider incentives in the voluntary provision
of public goods. Second, it has also been shown that after some time,
voluntary cooperation decreases even if most individuals are not free
riders and are conditional cooperators.160 Therefore, other mecha-
155. See Cherry et al., supra note 152, at 175–76.
156. Cubitt et al., supra note 154, at 110–111; Ananish Chaudhuri & Tirnud
Paichayontvijit, Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to a Public
Good, 3 ECON. BULL. 1, 14 fig.3 (2006).
157. Bethany Kirkpatrick, The Impact of Legal Mechanisms on Cooperation in Infi-
nitely Repeated Games: An Experimental Approach 1, 12 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Paris School of International Affairs), https://www.sciencespo.fr/
psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/The%20impact%20of%20legal%20mechanisms%20
on%20cooperation%20in%20infinitely%20repeated%20games_Bethany%20Kirkpat
rick.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HS7-3CCX]; Tyran & Feld, supra note 140, at 6.
158. See Romley et al., supra note 106, at 3.
159. See Buttenheim & Asch, supra note 111, at 2675; Romley et al., supra note
106, at 8.
160. See Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter, Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dy-
namics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 541, 542
(2010); Chaudhuri & Paichayontvijit, supra note 156, at 1.
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nisms, such as punishment, rewards, or in general, good institutional
designs might be necessary to sustain cooperation. Third, there is an
indication that cooperation preferences in public good provision are
unstable and change according to group identity. Thus, when matched
with individuals of a common identity, subjects consistently show the
preference for higher levels of conditional cooperation and less self-
serving bias than when interacting with individuals who are perceived
to belong to different identities. Moreover, individuals were more
prone to act as free riders when matched with individuals of a differ-
ent identity than in group matching.161 This finding might suggest that
even with solidarity legislation, parents may present low levels of con-
ditional cooperation if acting in solidarity is supposed to benefit indi-
viduals of different identities. This proposition seems to have a special
force for parents who are members of a close-knit community inter-
acting with outsiders. Furthermore, although theory and empirical re-
search suggest that conditional cooperation affects individuals’
willingness to vaccinate, there is currently not sufficient information
regarding the magnitude of this effect and the extent to which it might
vary across diseases, geography, age, and status groups.162
E. Final Thoughts on Effects of Solidarity Legislation
The application of expressive theories of the law to solidarity legis-
lation suggests that although this legislation is expected to have an
influence on parents’ vaccination behavior, its influence might be
limited.
This suggestion seems particularly valid regarding parents who are
members of a vaccine-averse, close-knit group. Solidarity legislation
will not easily motivate these parents because they are threatened by
in-group sanctions, they have a desire to be viewed as coordinators by
in-group members, they are influenced by a powerful competing focal
point, and they hold on to vaccination beliefs that are common in their
community.
The same is also true for parents with strong anti-vaccination atti-
tudes. Because they have misconceptions regarding the high risks and
low benefits of vaccines, distrust health authorities, and are influenced
by louder competing focal points, these parents might not change their
behavior even in the presence of a legislative message regarding the
social benefits of vaccination.
The influence of this legislation on hesitant parents is also not
straightforward. It might change depending on the extent of their mis-
161. See Matthias Lankau et al., Cooperation Preferences in the Provision of Public
Goods: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Social Identity 1–2 (Ctr. for Eur.
Governance & Econ. Dev. Research Working Papers No. 148, 2012), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2191469_code1296572.pdf?abstractid=2191469
&mirid=1 [https://perma.cc/V7DR-DFSM].
162. See sources cited supra note 108.
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conceptions regarding vaccines, their distrust of health providers, and
their community’s attitude toward vaccination.
Free riders may also have a questionable response to solidarity leg-
islation. Assuming (correctly or incorrectly) that vaccination rates are
above the required threshold, underestimating the fragility of herd im-
munity, believing that vaccination risks are high, and estimating the
probability of serious social condemnation as low, free-rider parents
might continue free riding even in the presence of solidarity
legislation.
Finally, other reasons, which are relevant to all types of parents,
might limit the expressive function of solidarity legislation. For exam-
ple, individuals are less inclined to cooperate when interacting with
individuals of different group identities.
However, these conclusions should not be understood as suggesting
that solidarity legislation has no expressive function. Rather, they sug-
gest that its influence might be limited, at least in some cases, and
highlight the reasons for its limited influence. As I will claim in the
last chapter, once these reasons have been identified, its influence
may be moderated, thus improving the expressive function of solidar-
ity legislation. Finally, it stresses the importance of conducting re-
search that will further explore the effect of including expressive
messages regarding solidarity in vaccination legislation.
V. THE DIRECT INFLUENCE OF SOLIDARITY LEGISLATION
Another potential justification for adopting solidarity legislation is
its direct influence on parents’ vaccination decisions. According to this
justification, mandating parents to be educated regarding the social
benefits of vaccination will increase their willingness to vaccinate their
children.
For this justification to be valid, the correctness of two hypotheses
should be examined: (1) the general hypothesis according to which
educating parents regarding vaccination improves their attitudes to-
wards vaccination and thus increases vaccination uptakes; and (2) the
specific hypothesis according to which informing parents regarding
the social benefits of vaccination is expected to motivate them to vac-
cinate their children. I will start by addressing the first hypothesis.
Considering that vaccine refusal and hesitancy have often been associ-
ated with misconception and uncertainty regarding vaccination, it is
not surprising that many believe communication is the most effective
way to increase knowledge and awareness regarding vaccines and that
providing parents additional information regarding vaccination will
encourage them to vaccinate.163
163. See Petrelli et al., supra note 132, at 92.
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Unfortunately, there is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of edu-
cational interventions.164 Although some empirical studies have iden-
tified the importance of providers’ recommendations and pro-vaccine
information in positively impacting parents’ attitudes toward vaccina-
tion, other studies have indicated that pro-vaccine messages do not
always work as intended.165 Thus, exposure to vaccination information
does not significantly influence parents’ vaccination intentions or be-
havior, and specific types of information may be counterproductive.166
The effectiveness of pro-vaccination messages directed to parents
who hold strong beliefs against vaccination is more controversial.167
Parents who hold particularly strong attitudes against vaccines, for ex-
ample, attitudes that are viewed as certain and stable, may be less
amenable to change their behavior following pro-vaccination informa-
tion.168 Thus, providing pro-vaccination information to these parents
might be futile.169
Findings concerning the second (the specific) hypothesis—that in-
forming parents regarding the social benefits of vaccination is ex-
pected to motivate them to vaccinate their children—indicate that the
connection between educating parents regarding the social benefits of
vaccination and vaccination decisions is not straightforward.
In general, there is evidence that prosocial motives play a role in
vaccination decisions and that individuals are sensitive to the positive
impact their vaccination could have on the health of others.170 For
164. See Eve Dube´ et al., Strategies Intended to Address Vaccine Hesitancy: Review
of Published Reviews, 33 VACCINE 4191, 4200 (2015); Paul Corben & Julie Leask, To
Close the Childhood Immunization Gap, We Need a Richer Understanding of Parents’
Decision-Making, 12 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 3168, 3171 (2016).
165. See Zachary Horne et al., Countering Antivaccination Attitudes, 112 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 10321, 10321–22 (2015); Williams, supra note 132, at 2594.
166. See Corben & Leask, supra note 164, at 3172; Joshua Greenberg et al., Vaccine
Hesitancy: In Search of the Risk Communication Comfort Zone, PLOS CURRENTS
(Mar. 3, 2017), http://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/vaccine-hesitancy-in-search-
of-the-risk-communication-comfort-zone/ [https://perma.cc/BZE7-FCS9]; Brendan
Nyhan et al., Effective Messages in Vaccine Promotion: A Randomized Trial, 133 PE-
DIATRICS 1, 7 (2014).
167. Nyhan et al., supra note 166, at 7; Tara C. Smith, Vaccine Rejection and Hesi-
tancy: A Review and Call to Action, OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 5 (July 11, 2017),
https://academic.oup.com/ofid/article-pdf/4/3/ofx146/19601926/ofx146.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/D83L-T7FS]; Ashley Colman, Changing Attitudes: The Vaccine-Autism Debate,
GRADUATE SEMINAR SOC. PSYCHOL. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://graduatesocialpsych
.weebly.com/class-blogs---public/changing-attitudes-the-vaccine-autism-debate [https:/
/perma.cc/7RR5-WGPN].
168. Nyhan et al., supra note 166, at 7.
169. Id.
170. See Meng Li et al., Stimulating Influenza Vaccination via Prosocial Motives,
PLOS ONE 2 (July 26, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0159780&type=printable [https://perma.cc/7284-ZXQF]; Rachel
Casiday, Risk and Trust in Vaccine Decision Making, 13 DURHAM ANTHROPOLOGY J.
para. 5.9 (2005), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rachel_Casiday/publication/44
094655_Risk_and_trust_in_vaccine_decision_making/links/56460b7508ae9f9c13e731
d0/Risk-and-trust-in-vaccine-decision-making.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDL6-F46W];
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example, several studies concerning hypothetical vaccines have indi-
cated that individuals were sensitive to the positive impact their vacci-
nation could have on the health of other individuals.171 However, the
implications of these findings are claimed to be limited by the hypo-
thetical nature of the vaccine in the scenarios, the characteristics of
participants in the study, or the correlational design of the study.172
Studies on parental vaccination decisions suggest that parents may
be willing to vaccinate their children for the benefit of others.173 How-
ever, these findings were claimed to be limited by their reliance on
interviews or questionnaires directly asking parents their reasons for
vaccination and their focus on parents’ vaccination intentions instead
of vaccination behavior.174 Other studies have found that emphasizing
the societal benefits of vaccination to parents did not increase their
intentions to vaccinate their child. In fact, one study found that under-
scoring the vaccine’s benefits to the society, without explicit mention
of the expected benefits to the child, did not result in higher levels of
parental intentions to vaccinate with the MMR vaccine.175 Another
study indicated that parents viewed community protection only as a
bonus rather than a primary aim.176
It therefore follows that the existing evidence does not conclusively
support the causal impact of providing parents information regarding
the prosocial benefits of vaccines on vaccination decisions.177
Moreover, evidence shows that the influence of this information
might vary depending on parents’ characteristics and the nature of in-
formation provided to them.178 Thus, studies of parental vaccination
Dube´ et al., supra note 110, at 1769–70; Maheen Quadri-Sheriff et al., The Role of
Herd Immunity in Parents’ Decision to Vaccinate Children: A Systematic Review, 130
PEDIATRICS 522, 528–29 (2012); Julie Leask et al., What Maintains Parental Support
for Vaccination When Challenged by Antivaccination Messages? A Qualitative Study,
24 VACCINE 7238, 7242–43 (2006).
171. See Jeffrey T. Vietri et al., Vaccinating to Help Ourselves and Others, 32 MED.
DECISION MAKING 447, 454 (2012); John C. Hershey et al., The Roles of Altruism,
Free Riding, and Bandwagoning in Vaccination Decisions, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. HUM. DECISION PROCESS 177, 186–87 (1994); Gretchen B. Chapman et al.,
Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior, 23
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1008, 1014 (2012); Eunha Shim et al., The Influence of Altruism on
Influenza Vaccination Decisions, 9 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 2234, 2240–41 (2012);
Cornelia Betsch et al., Inviting Free-Riders or Appealing to Prosocial Behavior?
Game-Theoretical Reflections on Communicating Herd Immunity in Vaccine Advo-
cacy, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 978, 983 (2013).
172. See Li et al., supra note 170, at 2; Vietri, supra note 171, at 454.
173. See Quadri-Sheriff et al., supra note 170, at 528–29; Li et al., supra note 170, at
2.
174. Li et al., supra note 170, at 2.
175. See Kristin S. Hendrix et al., Vaccine Message Framing and Parents’ Intent to
Immunize Their Infants For MMR, 134 PEDIATRICS e675, e680 (2014).
176. See Vietri et al., supra note 171, at 448.
177. See Li et al., supra note 170, at 2.
178. See id. at 10. Findings that support this claim were also found in Meng Li and
others’ studies, which addressed flu vaccination intentions. The researchers reported
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decisions indicate that vaccine decliners are disinclined to vaccinate
their children for the benefit of the community.179 It has also been
shown that when a message emphasizes the personal benefit of indi-
rect protection provided to individuals through herd immunity, indi-
viduals’ inclination to free ride increases. This was particularly the
case when the social benefit of herd immunity was not communicated.
In contrast, although communicating the social benefit did not result
in a general increase in vaccination intentions, it did reduce free-riding
and could have increased vaccination intentions when the costs of vac-
cinating are perceived as low.180 These results suggest that vaccination
uptake may increase or decrease depending on the salience of per-
sonal versus social benefits of herd immunity.181 Further, the MMR
study suggests that emphasizing the various benefits of MMR vaccina-
tion directly to the vaccine recipient or society may differentially im-
pact parents’ intentions to vaccinate their infants against MMR. More
specifically, it was shown that underscoring the vaccine’s benefits to
society, without explicit mention of benefits directly to the child, did
not result in higher levels of parental intentions to vaccinate.182
Several conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, in general,
there is mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of communication
interventions in motivating parents to vaccinate their children. More
specifically, the evidence does not conclusively support the causal con-
nection between providing parents information regarding the
prosocial benefits of vaccines and vaccination decisions.183 Second,
parents’ willingness to vaccinate their children may differ depending
on the nature and types of information provided to them. Thus, spe-
cific types of information may be counterproductive, whereas other
types may be productive. Third, parents who hold particularly strong
anti-vaccination attitudes and vaccine decliners might be less respon-
sive to communication interventions, in general, and information re-
garding vaccination social benefits, specifically.
VI. IMPROVING THE EXPRESSIVE AND DIRECT INFLUENCE
OF SOLIDARITY LEGISLATION
In the final two parts of this Article, I examined whether solidarity
legislation is expected to influence parents’ vaccine decisions. The dis-
cussion suggested that although this legislation is expected to have
direct and indirect influences on parents’ vaccination behavior, its ex-
pected influence is limited.
that highlighting flu victims increased intentions to vaccinate, particularly among indi-
viduals who had not vaccinated the previous year. See id.
179. See Vietri et al., supra note 171, at 448.
180. See Betsch et al., supra note 171, at 983.
181. See id. at 979.
182. See Hendrix et al., supra note 175, at e680.
183. See Li et al., supra note 170, at 2.
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That doesn’t mean that solidarity legislation should not be adopted.
To begin with, although the magnitude of its influence is not entirely
clear, there is a theoretical and empirical basis for the assumption that
this legislation is expected to have an influence on parents’ vaccine
behavior.184
Furthermore, the expressive and direct influence of solidarity legis-
lation may be improved. The remaining part will present potential
methods through which the effect of this legislation on parents’ vacci-
nation behavior may be improved.
First, the effectiveness of informing parents regarding the social
benefits of vaccination, as well as the effect of including expressive
solidarity messages in vaccination legislation, should be further ex-
plored through empirical studies.185 Moreover, consideration should
be given to existing evidence that suggests the potential influence of
several factors on vaccination decisions: information framing, the con-
tent of information, the nature of the educational process, and the
source of information.
As the previous discussion suggested, information framing may
have a positive or negative influence on parents’ vaccination inten-
tions. Thus, focusing on the indirect protection herd immunity pro-
vides may result in negative results in the form of free riding. On the
other hand, appealing to vaccination social benefits (for example, the
protection provided to others through herd immunity) may have a
positive effect and reduce free-riding tendencies.186 Underscoring the
vaccine’s benefits to the child and to society may result in higher in-
tentions to vaccinate, whereas underscoring the vaccine’s benefits to
society, without explicit mention of the benefits directly to the child, is
not expected to result in higher levels of parental intentions to vacci-
nate.187 Current studies also indicate that providing parents with two-
sided messages with claims both for and against vaccines decreases
parents’ intentions to vaccinate similar to one-sided, anti-vaccine-only
messages. However, providing parents balanced information while
184. Leask et al., supra note 170, at 7243. Regarding the claims that presenting
vaccinations as a social good might be a worthwhile and potentially overlooked strat-
egy and that health authorities should highlight individuals’ obligations toward other
individuals and the importance of vaccinations for the wider community. See id.; Ohid
Yaqub et al., Attitudes to Vaccination: A Critical Review, 112 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 7
(2014).
185. The need for further research regarding this issue has been noted by several
scholars. See, e.g., Li et al., supra note 170, at 10–11; Betsch et al., supra note 171, at
982–83.
186. See Betsch et al., supra note 171, at 983–84. This approach was adopted by the
health departments in Vermont and Oregon. The information provided to parents in
both states briefly relates to herd immunity, while the social benefit of vaccines is
emphasized. See Parent Education Required for Completion of Vermont’s Religious
Exemption Form, supra note 62; Vaccine Education Module, supra note 66.
187. See Hendrix et al., supra note 175, at 680.
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emphasizing scientific consensus may improve their vaccination
willingness.188
The framing of information regarding vaccines’ social benefits
should also be sensitive to research regarding what motivates individ-
uals to act prosocially. A group of studies has shown that individuals
are more likely to exhibit prosocial behavior towards individuals to
whom they are directly connected, and this tendency is greater to-
wards individuals who are only a few steps removed in their social
network (for example, friends of friends) than toward more distant
others.189 Thus, it has been shown that individuals share larger
amounts of resources with their kin and are more likely to share re-
sources with friends and acquaintances than with strangers. Shared
identities, such as ethnicity, religion, or political partisanship, have
also been shown to affect individuals’ other-regarding preferences.190
These findings suggest that the information provided to parents
should stress the benefits of vaccination to the recipient’s kin, friends,
and acquaintances, instead of only describing its benefits to the society
as a whole.191
This does not necessarily indicate that the benefits of vaccination to
strangers should be completely omitted from the information pro-
vided to parents. As Prainsack and Buyx recognized, solidaristic prac-
tice regularly occurs where there are stark differences among
individuals. This is the state of things in the case of vaccination: Par-
ents are often required to vaccinate their child for the protection of
other children they do not know and may be of a completely distinc-
tive social group. According to Prainsack and Buyx, even under these
circumstances, individuals will act in solidarity with other individuals
if they recognize subjective similarity with them in a relevant respect.
The recognition of similarity may take many forms: It entails the
awareness of being associated, by choice, fate, or other circumstances,
188. See Christopher E. Clarke et al., The Influence of Weight-of-Evidence
Messages on (Vaccine) Attitudes: A Sequential Mediation Model, 20 J. HEALTH COMM.
1302, 1306–07 (2015); Graham Dixon & Christopher Clarke, The Effect of Falsely
Balanced Media Representations of the Autism-Vaccine Controversy on Vaccine Safety
Perceptions and Behavioral Intentions, 28 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 352, 355–56 (2012).
This strategy was adopted in Vermont. Although parents should be informed that
some parents choose not to immunize because they are concerned about vaccine risk,
health providers are instructed to provide parents scientifically based information in-
dicating that while side effects or adverse events are possible, most are very rare or
mild. See Parent Education Required for Completion of Vermont’s Religious Exemp-
tion Form, supra note 62, at 2.
189. See Delia Baldassarri & Guy Grossman, The Effect of Group Attachment and
Social Position on Prosocial Behavior. Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiments, 8
PLOS ONE e58750, e58751 (2013).
190. Id. at e58750.
191. This strategy was adopted by the Israeli Ministry of Health during the 2013
Polio crisis in Israel. See Nili Karako-Eyal, The Right for Autonomy, the Duty of Dis-
closure and Public Health Considerations—The 2013 Polio Crisis in Israel as a Case
Study, 36 PACE L. REV. 908, 923 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL203.txt unknown Seq: 42 15-FEB-19 10:19
386 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
with other individuals. This understanding leads to two conclusions.
First, information regarding social benefits to others should be framed
to underscore the potential similarities with them (for example, infor-
mation framed as applying to all human beings). Second, the informa-
tion provided to parents should not be limited to the benefits of
vaccination to other individuals. Attention should also be given to the
expected benefit to the community. More specifically, parents should
be informed of the common interest all members of the community
share in preventing epidemics (for example, preventing the costs in-
volved in epidemic outbreaks).192
When framing solidarity messages, consideration should also be
given to findings that indicate greater empathy and a heightened sense
of personal responsibility towards the victim are powerful motivating
factors in prosocial behavior. These findings suggest that the educa-
tional process should be designed to increase empathy and personal
responsibility among parents, for example, by describing the injuries
and suffering that epidemic victims might suffer and emphasizing the
personal responsibility of the individuals who failed to vaccinate for
these consequences.193
Providing parents certain types of information may also improve
their motivation to act in solidarity. Therefore, it is important to in-
form parents that all members of the community share a common in-
terest in preventing epidemics (for example, preventing the costs
involved in epidemic outbreaks) and thus in preserving high rates of
vaccination. According to McAdams, for the focal point theory to
work, the parties to the conflict should share an interest in avoiding
unresolved conflicts so each party will consider the escalation of con-
flict as the worst outcome. It follows that information provided to par-
ents under the category of “social benefits” should not be limited to
the benefits of vaccination to other individuals. It should also include
findings regarding the costs involved in epidemic outbreaks to the
community and the indirect influence on each of its members (for ex-
ample, decreased availability of health providers to treat other pa-
tients). Although this information will not likely motivate parents who
hold strong attitudes against vaccination to change their behavior, it
might influence hesitant parents and free riders.
Considering the potential effects of social attitudes and conditional
cooperation on parental behavior, parents should also be informed
that although some parents choose to not vaccinate their children,
192. Illinois and Michigan are the only two states that relate in their legislation to
vaccine benefits to the community. See supra notes 61, 67–69. Vermont, Oregon, and
Washington only mention benefits to others. See supra notes 62–66, 70–74.
193. See Li et al., supra note 170, at 2, 10. Vermont and Washington frame the
information that should be provided to parents in a way that emphasizes the personal
liability of individuals who fail to vaccinate their children to the suffering of others.
See supra notes 62, 70–74.
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most parents vaccinate their children, and vaccination is a practice ap-
proved by the majority in the society.194
Empirical studies have shown that in some cases, alerting groups of
conditional cooperators helps to generate higher contributions than
the control treatment.195 This effect was also identified in the context
of vaccination. Hershey and colleagues determined that the vaccina-
tion behavior of other individuals exerted most of its influence
through bandwagoning or the desire to behave the way others are be-
having without regard to the consequences.196 They also determined
that individuals’ willingness to vaccinate increased proportionally with
their belief that others were willing to do the same.197 Another study
suggested that parents’ intentions to vaccinate their children against
Hepatitis B were significantly greater when presented with the beliefs
that most of their friends and others important to the parents would
vaccinate and appreciate the parents’ decision to vaccinate.198
The nature of the communication process may also influence par-
ents’ vaccination intentions and should therefore also be considered
when an educational encounter is planned. A critical factor that
shapes parental attitudes to vaccination is the interaction with the
healthcare provider. An effective interaction that addresses the con-
cerns of hesitant parents can motivate them towards vaccine accept-
ance. On the other hand, poor communication that fails to account for
the complexity of reasons that lead to vaccination refusal may result in
a backfire effect and lead to the rejecting vaccination.199 The factors
that may negatively influence parents’ intentions to vaccinate include
judgmental discourse, pressure to vaccinate, or too strongly advocat-
ing vaccination.200 Consistent with these findings are parents’ reported
194. Oregon adopted an approach whereby the information provided to parents
through the module includes an explicit statement that most parents in the state
choose to vaccinate. See Vaccine Education Module, supra note 66.
195. See Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, Conditional Cooperation and Volun-
tary Contribution to Public Goods, 102 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 23, 37 (2000). How-
ever, there is also an indication that the framing of this information is important. For
example, it has been shown that informing individuals who already engaged in the
desired activity that other individuals engage in the desired behavior less often than
they did, resulted in a reduction in the desirable action. On the other hand, providing
normative feedback regarding the level of the desired activity to individuals who en-
gage in the desired activity less than the average improved their behavior and resulted
in an increase in the desired activity. See Romley et al., supra note 106, at 2.
196. See Vietri et al., supra note 171, at 448.
197. See Robert Bo¨hm et al., Exploring and Promoting Prosocial Vaccination: A
Cross-Cultural Experiment on Vaccination of Health Care Personnel, 2016 BIOMED
RES. INT’L 5 (2016), http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/bmri/2016/6870984.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NXM8-QRBT].
198. See Romley et al., supra note 106, at 7.
199. See Julie Leask et al., Communicating with Parents about Vaccination: A
Framework for Health Professionals, 12 BMC PEDIATRICS 154, 154–53 (2012), https://
bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2431-12-154 [https://perma.cc/
ERQ7-P6EK].
200. See Ames et al., supra note 132, at 19.
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wishes that healthcare providers conduct open, respectful discussions
with them regarding vaccination in a caring, sensitive and nonjudg-
mental manner; provide clear answers to their questions; and provide
a supportive environment for decision making.201 These findings
should be addressed when discussing the social benefits of vaccination
with parents. More specifically, it suggests that although parents’ per-
sonal responsibility for the health of others should not be ignored, the
discussion should not take the form of an oppositional discourse dur-
ing which parents are severely blamed for causing damages to other
individuals.
Attention should also be paid to the source of the information. Ac-
cording to several studies, information or reassurance from a health-
care provider is the main factor in changing parents’ vaccination
decisions. Moreover, it has been shown that the most trusted sources
of vaccine-related information are family physicians and other medi-
cal professionals.202 This finding does not necessarily indicate that
other sources of information should not also be used. Printed materi-
als, web links, or decision aids given prior to or used during the con-
sultation may be helpful in supporting the educational process.203
However, they imply that the use of an educational module as the
only platform for educating parents regarding the social benefits of
vaccination, a method adopted by Oregon and Utah legislators, is
undesirable.
Policy makers should also acknowledge the fact that simply provid-
ing information regarding the social benefits of vaccination might not
be effective when parents are members of a close knit, vaccine-averse
community. As the previous discussion suggests, these parents are
highly influenced by in-group beliefs and norms regarding vaccination
and are not expected to be easily influenced by out-group information
regarding the social benefits of vaccination or messages regarding the
ethical nature of acting in solidarity. In these cases, the use of differ-
ent methods should be considered. First, understanding the beliefs
and norms of the group and framing the information in a way that
reflects them might be effective. Thus, when the parents are members
of a religious group, it might help to present the ethical duty to act in
solidarity as justified through religious norms or at least as not contra-
dicting the religious beliefs of the group.204 Another potential method
201. Id. at 27.
202. See Greenberg et al., supra note 166; Ames et al., supra note 132, at 15.
203. See Leask et al., supra note 199, at 157.
204. For a detailed discussion regarding religious attitudes towards vaccination, see
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain:
Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization, 65 HASTINGS L.J.
1151, 1573–84 (2014). Reiss reported that excluding some small, radical sects, no ma-
jor religion prohibits vaccines, several religions actively recommend and, some even
require that parents vaccinate their children against preventable diseases. See id. at
1573–74.
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is the use of an in-group source as a change agent. Classic work in
social psychology has indicated that persuasive messages lead to
greater attitude change when they are presented by a source who
shares the same group identification with the message recipients than
when they are presented by a source who does not share this member-
ship. This is particularly true when the message is delivered by a pro-
totypical or representative of the group (for example, a religious
leader) for the recipient identified with and when one’s identification
with the group is strong.205 This suggestion is supported by previous
and current experience. Thus, in general, the involvement of religious
leaders in health-related interventions has been shown to improve the
participation of their congregations in these interventions. Organiza-
tions such as the United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund advocate for enhancing trust in immunization by, among other
things, seeking partnership with religious leaders and groups for the
purpose of reaching maximum vaccination coverage worldwide.206
Finally, the legislature should acknowledge the expressive function
of statements included in legislation. This leads to two conclusions.
First, explicit statements regarding vaccines’ social benefits should be
part of vaccination legislation. Including this information in the ex-
emption forms or providing it to parents only during the education
encounter is not sufficient. Second, for solidarity legislation to accom-
plish its expressive potential, it should be conveyed to all parents, not
just parents who request an exemption.
VII. CONCLUSION
Several states in the U.S. have included in their legislation a refer-
ence to the social benefits of vaccination, thus conceptualizing the eth-
ical value of solidarity as a legal principle. This Article explored the
potential effects of this legislation on parents’ vaccination behavior.
There is support for the claim that conceptualizing solidarity as a legal
term might increase parents’ willingness to vaccinate their children.
The inclusion of statements regarding the social benefits of vaccines in
vaccination legislation and obligating parents to be educated about it
205. See Joanne R. Smith & Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity and Attitudes, in AT-
TITUDES AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 337, 344 (William D. Crano & Radmila Prislin eds.,
2008); Leor M. Hackel et al., Social Identity Shapes Social Valuation: Evidence From
Prosocial Behavior and Vicarious Reward, 12 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 1219, 1219–20 (2017). For this type of method to succeed, a leader or
other representative of the group who supports vaccination and is willing to promote
it on behalf of authorities should be identified. Otherwise, the dialogue with him or
her is not likely to contribute to increased vaccination coverage. See Wilhelmina L.M.
Ruijs et al., The Role of Religious Leaders in Promoting Acceptance of Vaccination
Within a Minority Group: A Qualitative Study, BMC PUB. HEALTH 7 (2013), https://
bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-13-511 [https://per
ma.cc/W57P-8WFZ].
206. See id. at 2.
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might change their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. However, it was
also shown that the effect of this legislation on parents’ behavior is
expected to be limited and is highly sensitive to parents’ characteris-
tics and attitudes towards vaccines.
These findings do not imply that this legislation should not be
adopted by other states. In contrast, I believe that other states should
seriously consider the adoption of solidarity legislation. Although fur-
ther research is required, to date, there is already sufficient theoretical
and empirical basis to support the claim that solidarity legislation
might positively influence parents’ vaccination behavior.
Moreover, the influence of this legislation on parents’ vaccination
behavior can be improved. To begin with, attention should be on the
framing of the information. For example, vaccines’ benefits to the re-
cipient’s kin, friends, and acquaintances should be stressed, potential
similarities with other individuals should be underscored, or a com-
mon interest all members of the community share in preventing
epidemics should be presented. Providing certain types of information
to parents is also advisable. For example, parents should be informed
that most members of the community vaccinate their children and that
vaccination is a practice the majority of society approves. Special at-
tention should be given to the communication process and the source
of the information. Thus, providing parents with information through
a module, but not obligating them to personally meet a health pro-
vider, is not advisable. At the same time, attention should be given to
the fact that for a face-to-face encounter to be successful in changing
parents’ behavior, it should be open, respectful, caring, and nonjudg-
mental. Finally, different methods should be considered when parents
are part of a close-knit, vaccine-averse community. In these cases,
changing legislation or conducting face-to-face encounters with out-
group healthcare providers might not be effective in changing parents’
behavior.
Solidarity legislation is in its initial stages. It has the potential to
decrease exemption rates and as such deserves further research and
careful attention. Policy makers should strive to understand how law’s
expressive function works, search for empirical findings regarding the
connection between information and vaccination decisions, identify
potential impediments to the influence of solidarity legislation, and
seek methods to overcome them.
